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**School of Social Sciences
Indira Gandhi National Open University**

**IMPACT AND ASSOCIATED FACTORS OF CONFLICT OVER RESOURCE AND
LIVELIHOOD IN PASTORALIST COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF AFAR - ISSA
CONFLICT IN AMIBARA WOREDA, AFAR REGIONAL STATE**

By: Shimles Abebaw(BA)

ID No. ID1322083

**A THESIS DRAFT REPORT SUBMITTED TO IGNOU UNIVERSITY,
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THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ART**

Advisor: Dr. Elias Berhanu Debela

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DECLARATION

I hereby Declare that the **DISSERTATION ENTITLED IMPACT AND ASSOCIATED FACTORS OF CONFLICT OVER RESOURCE AND LIVELIHOOD IN PASTORALIST COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF AFAR - ISSA CONFLICT IN AMIBARA WOREDA, AFAR REGIONAL STATE** Submitted by me for the partial fulfillment the MPA to Indira Gandhi National Open University (**IGNOU**) New Delhi is my own original work and has not been summated earlier, either to **IGNOUS** or to any other institution for the fulfillment of the requirement for any other programmer of study. I also declare that no chapter of this manuscript in whole or in part is lifted and incorporated in this report from any earlier work done by me or others.

Place:- Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Date:- April,2016

Signature -----

Enrolment No: ID1322083

Name: Shimelis Abebaw Shiferaw

Address :- Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

CERTIFICATE

I certified that the Dissertation entitled **IMPACT AND ASSOCIATED FACTORS OF CONFLICT OVER RESOURCE AND LIVELIHOOD IN PASTORALIST COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF AFAR - ISSA CONFLICT IN AMIBARA WOREDA, AFAR REGIONAL STATE** submitted by Shimelis Ababaw is his own work and has been done under my supervision. It is recommended that this dissertation be placed before the examiner of evaluation.

(Signature of the academic supervisor)

Name: -----

Address: -----

Study Center: -----

Regional center:- -----

Date :- -----

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AU	African Union
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit
DFID	Department for International Development
DFLD	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Djibouti
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GTZ	German Development Co-operation
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority for Development
LZ	Livelihood Zone
MoFA	Ministry of Federal Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
Ugaas	The clan-heads of the Issa/Somali
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WPE	Workers' Party of Ethiopia
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front

Abstract

The study was carried out to Assess the impact and its associated factors of conflict over resource and livelihood in pastoralist community in the case of Afar - Issa Conflict in Amibaraworeda , Afar Regional State. The study comprises both quantitative and qualitative methods. Out of 900 house hold, A total of 150 household heads were interviewed on conflicts and its impact in the studyarea. Key informant interview and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) were also conducted with woreda administration officials, experts working for administration and peace office, clan leaders, and elders to get adequate information on cause of conflict, consequence of conflict, its aggravating factors and the conflict resolutions mechanism. Results from the , FGD and key informants interview showed that all study participants of both groups opposed conflicts because it has influence on their livelihood. Besides, findings of the study also indicates that major causes and factors in Afar-Issa conflict like competition over resource, need to expand their territory, external invasion and others factors including prolonged drought respectively. Indeed, this study further emphasis and analyses that the consequence and impact of Afar-Issa conflict like human and livestock death, depletion of financial asset, destruction of infrastructure, degradation of natural resource and forced migration respectively and also the resolution mechanisms of Afar-Issa conflict like peace negotiations, strengthen the joint peace committee, and locally like Madaa and ugaas in which peace-building and economic integration across this region are the core part of this thesis. The current study shows that the area is in problem of conflict and needs immediate attention from all concerned bodies and should implements different teaching mechanisms and strategies to settle the conflicts in the study area.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Back ground of the study

In pastoral society conflict is usual because of their life style and culture. There are many reasons to raise conflict In Ethiopia such as competition to access resource, livestock and small scale irrigation and land for farming and pasture are principal source of social tension, there is no clear boundary to resource.

Violent conflict is more the norm than the exception in the Horn of Africa. Conflicts are waged at various levels: state, regional, and local. Conflict involves various actors: governments, nationalist groups, religious groups, and community or identity groups with significant backing from external forces.

Tades and Yona,(2001:1) stated that, 'conflict describes relationships in which each party perceives the other's goals, values, interests or behavior as antithetical to its own'. Starting from this, there can be a multitude of ways to resolve such existing or perceived contradictions. Any society and any political system in the world have to try to develop its own institutions, organization, and systems to handle conflicts peacefully and to prevent violence. 'What has to be prevented is violence, not necessarily conflict as such. Rather conflict can and perhaps should be accepted as an inevitable component of all-social political relations, as well as an indicator of problems'. Finally, it should not be forgotten that conflict is a most powerful factor to bring about change and development in the above-mentioned definition.

The underlying causes of such inter and/or intra-group scenarios of conflicts are complex and intricate. As such, the conflicts were products of implications of various determinants of state and society relations and institutions. These causes may vary from tendencies of competition over scarce material resources, to aspirations of being dominant intra-group forces, to geographical, Psycho-cultural historical feelings or biases of non-complimentarily, to tensions induced by extra group factors such as different forms of state intervention, resource alienation (especially land), Political-oppressions, etc.

Pastoralists noted declining access to rangelands and increasing farming and land enclosure. Interestingly, both agro-pastoralists and those relying only on agriculture previously were diversifying and had an increasing number of animals to look after. This placed increased

pressure on the grazing areas surrounding, or close to, land being used for agriculture. Restrictions on mobility were affecting. Pastoralists as changes in land use, or in some cases in security, were impacting on seasonal access to water and pasture. More extreme climatic variations were consistently reported, and attributed to climate change, affecting agriculture and quality of grazing. This is a complex subject and hard data that documents changes and impact of alterations in weather patterns at the micro-level is not available. Changes in livestock ownership patterns, commercialization, and composition are also affecting mobility and which types of grazing are accessed (Aklilu and Catley, 2010).

In a context of highly variable rains and a mobile lifestyle that sometimes brings different clans into competition over scarce resources, clashes between Afar and Somali (Issa) clans typically have involved cycles of cattle-rustling and theft as they seek to restock or exact revenge for raids and killings. Severe drought temporarily reduces conflict as communities struggle to survive, but climate change has worsened the problems of scarcity and intensified competition and conflict. The afar and Somalia/Issa/ people is living as a neighbor since back to many years by sharing common religion, common environment and way of life/livelihood/, exchange of market products, by sharing their traditions and beyond this; However, through this ancient relation conflict is still common phenomena over the scarce resources shared by the two peoples.

Even if there is no written documents about how the conflict had started, oral evidences from elders indicate that the conflict was started in 1948 with high blood shed from both peoples and finally the afar people when they were live in the former Adal, Issa and Gurgura area were left the lands of Asbuli, erer, aydol and butiji area including the east parts of the rail trail parts and The governmrnt of Emperor Hailesilase decided the river of Erer as a natural geographical demarcation in one side for afar and in other side for Somalia/Issa/ people. (Report of MOFA,2010)

Since then, to alleviate this problem from the root Emperor Hailesilase and the DergRegim were taken different strategy based on their administrative policy and doctrine; However, the federal and regional governments of EPRDF has taken different measures, especially after conducting a common peace conference in 2010 at Sodere so many important measures were taken place for creating sustainable peace in the area. Furthermore, the government conducted in depth discussion with the communities especially on common issues like the town of

Gedamaytu, Adaytu and Hundufo for whom they belong geographically and administratively. (Report of MOFA,2010)

Therefore, Livelihoods analysis in conflict-affected areas should automatically include conflict analysis, leading to programming strategies in which livelihoods work and peace-building work are not separate entities but combined, mutually reinforcing approaches.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Particularly pervasive violent conflicts in the Horn of Africa have detrimental effects on people's livelihoods there. Likewise the Afar and Issaof Ethiopia have long been interlocked in protracted violent conflict since the turn of twenty Century to date. The conflict has been involving various causes, actors and impacts at different periods. Changes in the context of conflict have been contributing to the nature and dynamics of the conflict and lead to human, material, environmental and social damage.

While the intensity, causes, and repercussions of violent conflicts vary spatially and temporally, pastoral areas are currently the hotspots. So far different studies has done by different researchers on Conflicts between Afar Pastoralists and their Neighbors specifically Afar-Issa case: by giving due attention from different intellectual Angles like Yakob and Getachew focused on the economic and political marginalization, administrative penetration and expropriation of pastoralists and their resources for huge non-pastoralist production systems by successive governments central to lively hood explanation, Ayele, the conflict is mainly characterized as common pastoralist conflict over scarce natural resource, fuelled by violence promoting cultural values, environmental degradation and the transhumant nature of pastoralist mode of production that require vast area and multiplicity of ecosystems, Issa-Afar conflict relates it to the nature mainly to the nature of the Ethiopian state. Others relate the conflict dynamics with scarcity and demographic Pressure (Bulcha, 2003; Tesfay,2003) and other; However, my research is specifically focusing on the impact and its associated factors of the conflict on resource and livelihood of the comm from different perspectives which was not fully addressed by the prior researches done by many researchers, Therefore, In order to investigate and assess this problem, will be answered the following research questions.

1.2.1 Research questions

The following questions are raised in this study

1. What are the major factors associated with Afar-Issa conflict?
2. To what extent does the conflict affect the resource and livelihood of the pastoralist community?
3. Which type of livelihood is more affected by the conflict?
4. How much it is effective the action taken by the government to solve the problem?

1.3 Objectives of the study

1.3.1 General Objective

The general objective of this study is to Assess the impact and its associated factors of conflict over resource and livelihood in pastoralist community in the case of Afar - Issa Conflict in Amibaraworeda , Afar Regional State.

1.3.2 Specific objectives

The specific objectives of the study was ;

- To identify factors associated with Afar-Issa conflict from the previous until now
- To evaluate the impact of conflict over resource and the livelihood of the pastoralist communities.
- To understand which types of their livelihood is more affected by the conflict and in what case and extent.
- To assess conflict resolution mechanisms and government intervention in the pastoralist community of Afar- Issaconflict.

1.4 Significance of the Study

The study is expected to be useful from many dimensions. As we know clearly the impact of conflict over resources have a complicated problem on the livelihood of the affected communities; therefore, the research findings will help the politicians and the local governments by showing them clearly how the livelihood of communities is going be affected by the conflict which can be taking place by the two different ethnic group neighboring communities over the scarce resources, like death, migration, psychological problem which can be printed on the mind of the communities, restricted mobility to

access water, to access pasture for livestock's, health facilities, educational services, market, and other can be affected by the conflict .

Furthermore, the outcomes of this study will might be contributed a lot for policy makers, stake holders, Federal government, regional governments ,elders, women's and clan leaders engaged in peace building activities and it also provides insightful clues for further researcher in the area

1.5 Organization of the study

Theinvestigator organized the paper in five chapters. The first chapter is contain introduction part of the research such as background of the study and problem statement, objective of the study, significant of the study, description of the study area, and limitation of the research. The second chapter will contain the related literature review briefly and the third chapter will contain the study Area. the fourth chapter, the data collected from different sources will carefully organized, analyzed and interpreted by using different tools like table, charts etc and SPSS. Chapter five of this research report will consist of the conclusion of the main research findings and recommendations.

1.6 Description of the study area

Under the current federal administrative structure of Ethiopia there are nine ethno linguistically divided regional states and two chartered cities. The Afar and Somali regions are among these nine member states within the Ethiopian federation. The Afar National Regional State, which is a homeland of Afar people with a new capital named Samara is located in northeast of Ethiopia. Similarly the Somali National Regional State with a capital in Jijiga is located in the eastern-most part of Ethiopia. The Ethiopia's Somali region covers an area of 279,252 km² and divided in nine Zonal administrations and 47 Weredas while the Afar region, covering an area of 108,860 km² is comprised of five Zones and 32 Weredas and bordering four regional states in Ethiopia, which are Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and Somali and further sharing international boundary with Djibouti and Eritrea. Similarly, the Somali region of Ethiopia borders Djibouti, Somali, Kenya and Ethiopian regions of Oromia, Afar and the chartered city of Dire Dawa as well.

According to the current map of federal Ethiopia, Afar and Somali regions have a common border stretching from the Middle Awash all the way towards the border of Djibouti. Meanwhile the northwest point of the Somali region and home of the Issa/Somali, Shinelle Zone, is

bordering two zonal administrations in the Afar region. Zone one (Awwsi Rasu) in the north and zone three (Gabi Rasu) in the south. Abraham (2002:1) explains Shinille zone as “one of the nine Zones of the Ethiopian Somali region and borders Djibouti and Somaliland in the north and east respectively; Jijiga zone in the southeast, and Oromiya and Afar regions in the south and west respectively.[...]Gurgura, Gedabursi and Hawiya clan groups are also the agro pastoral residents in the zone.” Shinelle, which is named for its largest town, Shinelle, has six weredas out of which five towns are located along the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway line.


Based on the 2007 Census conducted by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA), total population of Afar and Somali regional states are 1,411,092 and 4,439,147 respectively. The urban community in Afar region accounts 13.4% or 188,723 of the population while the urban inhabitants in Somali region number 621,210 or 14% of the total population that consisting of 2,468,784 men and 1,970,363 women; while there are 786,338 men and 624,754 women in the Afar region. Based on figures from the Central Statistical Agency in 2005, Shinelle, home of the Issa/Somalis in Ethiopia has an estimated total population of 452,112, of whom 237,067 were males and 215,045 were females; 79,574 or 17.6% of its population are urban dwellers.

The study was conducted in one districts in the southern part of the region, namely, Amibara ,one of the woredas in the region which is Part of the Administrative Zone 3, Amibara is bordered on the south by Awash Fentale, on the west by the Awash River which separates it from Dulecha, on the northwest by the Administrative Zone 5, on the north by Gewane, on the east by the Somali Region, and on the southeast by Oromia Region. Towns in Amibaraworeda include Awash Arba, Awash Sheleko, MelkaSedi and MelkaWerer.

AmibaraWoreda is located at 277 km away from North East of Addis Ababa, In Amibaraworeda which covers an Area 200707 Ha that Neighboring Reginal state in the eastSomali region, in the south Oromia region, in the west and South West Amhara region and in the North West Tigray region. The woreda center Andido which is at about 36 km from the zone capital Gebiresu and it has a total area of 38695 Ha. `

Gedmaytu is initially established as food aid storage and distribution centre during 1970s. Road construction camps were also set up there. Like any other truck-stop sites, the Derg dismantled Gedmaytu in 1974 and 1989. Similarly the Agazzi special commandos launched operation to crack down contrabandists' chain in Gedmaytu on 1st March 2008. However, Gedmaytu is today revived and even become one of the most known contraband centers within the country.

Gedmaytu that is recognized as kebele under AmiberaWereda literally means foxes in Afar language that indicates presence of too many foxes in the past around this area.



1.7 Ethical Consideration

The student researcher has got access to different kinds of documents and personal information. The researcher obeys the ethical values and situations not to disclose any data or information to others. Furthermore; the researcher used the data and information only for the purpose of the research. It is only the student researcher and his advisor who had access to the information collected through these questionnaires and document analysis.

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Nature and Definitions of Conflict

The etymology of the term conflict, the Latin word *com* means ‘together’ and *fligerem* means ‘to strike’. Accordingly, the term conflict is a ‘derivation from the Latin *Confligere*, to strike together, to clash’. These clashes may have various features ranges from “intrapersonal, interpersonal to inter-organizational and inter-group” (Kurt Singer 1949b in Fink1968: 434). To mean that conflict may arise between nations, institutions, between various groups, among family members and even within oneself.

Accordingly Mack and Snyder (1957:212-13 quoted in Fink1968: 431) concluded that “conflict is for the most part a rubber concept, being stretched and moulded for the purpose at hand.” Hence, academicians argued for and against in conceptualizing a general theory of conflict. As elaborated by Fink some argued in favor of a comprehensive theory on conflict knowledge in such a way that as a result of the contribution of many fields a general theory on conflict is emerging. On the other hand justifications against general theory on conflict knowledge argued that “no existing social science discipline, by itself, contains sufficient intellectual resources to achieve an adequate theory of international conflict crucial aspects of each particular kind of conflicts are inevitably overlooked by theories of greater generality true knowledge is of particular.” (Kurt Singer 1949 in Fink1968: 414)

Indeed as conflicts are usually arisen as a result of differences in dynamic socio cultural, politico-economical and physiological needs, analyzing individual conflict case by- case instead of deriving an abstract theory of conflict seems applicable for understanding and framing the genesis and potential resolution of each conflicts effectively. Though these two concepts are yet debatable, there is a general consensus that differences simply are not source of conflict unless those different groups compete over a certain scarce resource. Thus conflict may usually erupt when one party demands something or accuses the other for taking it/them. Scherrer (1988:119) argued that conflict can be defined in various ways that ranges from “the biological view point of Darwin’s approach in conceptualization of organic evolution as the biological theory of human aggression and conflict to socio-psychological approach of Smith’s view of social conflict as a

clash of interests between different groups within that structure of a society.” Moreover, in the Power-politics School of thought, attainment of power is the basic objective of the state that led to conflict. Because politics involves, who gets what, when and how. Thus actors scramble for the maximization of their vested interests while focusing on limited resources [that] results tension between actors. (Wallensteen1988: 119)

There are various definitions of the concept conflict. For instance, Samarasinghe et al. (1999:2) define conflict as perceived incompatibility of [humans] goals or aspirations. Conflict is an inherent part of human existence. According to (Lewis Coser 1957, 197) quoted in Tidwell (1998: 33), functionalities defined conflict as “the clash of values and interests, the tension between what is and what some groups feel ought to be.” And Tidwell (1998:33) further quoted Bercovitch (1984:6) for the Situationists definition of conflict as a “situation which generates incompatible goals or values among different parties” while communication interactionist Folger et al (1993:4) quoted in (ibid: 34) define conflict as “the interaction of interdependent people who perceive incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving those goals.”

Conflict is as old as human kind and as argued by Hintjens and Kiwuwa (2006:93) “conflicts do not only bring destruction, they also shape new opportunities [and] reduced social inequality.” Samarasinghe et al. (1999: 2) further argued that “[conflict] is a normal, even healthy dynamic. A certain amount of conflict can be constructive, inspiring creativity in thought, communication, and action. Even violent revolutionary conflict, viewed from the longer perspective of history, may be a force for progress. The American War of Independence and the Civil War, India’s fight for independence from the British, and the struggle of the South African blacks against apartheid fall into this category.” (Brinkerhoff et al. 1988:88) quoted in Tarekegn (2006:3) in their part affirmed the two sides of conflict by stating as “conflict has both cohesive and destructive effect in social organization in that it creates social cohesion among group members when they engage in conflict against alien groups.

On the contrary, however, conflict would have adverse effect on social cohesion particularly when it erupts within group members.” In fact as cited in Samarasinghe et al. (1999:2) collective conflict is generally associated with distinct groups self-identified as such with separate interests,

values and aspirations. Violence is normally understood as the use of physical force so as to cause injury or death [due to] vengeance killings, or a communal riot. Samarasinghe et al. (ibid: 9) further identifies the direct human and indirect socio-economic impacts as well as opportunity costs forgone due to violent conflicts. Accordingly “death by violence, famine or disease, stress and distress, migration and environmental destruction are direct human miseries that result from conflict. Erosion or degradation of social networks such as schools, clinics and family, destabilization of economic networks like marketing, destruction of infrastructure and loss of human capital that includes skills and knowledge are categorized as indirect Socio-economic impacts of conflict. Besides crops not grown, goods not traded, skills not learned and development not improved are some of opportunity costs of violent conflicts.” Despite a great number of victims, there are also some who benefit in every conflict. Indeed, many leaders (e.g. “warlords”) may stand to lose more from peace than continued conflict. Generally, all the above explanations on conflict reflect the fact that it is a normal social process, which is manifested in the course of human interaction particularly in a bid for scarce resources, status or power.

2.2. Conflict in Pastoralist Society

It involves peculiar contexts that includes what Azar referred as communal content, communal action and state action expressed in clan based narrow definition of identity, strong mobilization mechanism of ethnic and clan members for war at any time and absolute peculiar-exclusionary definition of identity, most often than not, coercive state measure and low level of integration, high degree of marginalization, extremely poor socioeconomic profile, precariousness of life in general. Conflicts grow out of such general back-grounds where in groups’ relationships and choice of action is defined by same factors.

Competition for scarce resources, relative deprivation coupled with image of participants and perception of threat are strong predictor and important condition for the likelihood of violence but are not *sin qua non*. As long as same phenomenon stimulates different level of perception, threat, and insecurity by different groups, the subjective self and enemy image formation and its social context are the necessary conditions to violence. The juxtaposed existence of the particular historical and political context identity redefinition and ethnic (clan) consciousness appears, the consequent change in and past memories of power relationship, interests defined under such condition totally determines pastoralist community nature of togetherness.

Moreover, the re-drawing of regional/local government boundaries and administrative structure, the emergence of new ethnic (political) elite, along with it the creation of multiple power epicenters, religious, social and economic centers strongly promotes mutual exclusive definition as well as perception of ‘we ness’ and the ‘others’. In a federal state structure, weak national economy (pastoral sectors the worst expression) and infant democratic experiment, past memories are called up on to radicalize new definition of ethnic identity and to fan ethnic animosity and intolerance by political elite. The political elite to win the favor of clan or community constituency (power bases) to secure political offices fabricate arguments for territorial claims and counter claims. (*ISSN, by AsnakeMenbere, volume 1 Issue 2, October 2013*)

2.3 Livelihoods and conflict in pastoralist areas

The Somali Region of Ethiopia is characterized by many of the same development issues affecting other mainly pastoralist areas of Ethiopia, and the Horn of Africa more widely. A very longstanding and core problem has been conflict, which, in part, relates to the limited and variable natural resources in pastoralist areas and competition for resources between groups. However, conflict also has many other dimensions in these areas due to factors such as changing national political ideologies and structures, limited government capacities in more remote areas, and the frequent “cross-border” aspects of conflict.

During the last 15 years or so, humanitarian and development aid organizations and donors have supported an increasing array of peace-building, conflict resolution, or similar programmes in pastoralist areas. When implemented by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), these programs often focus on conflict resolution activities at the levels of local government and communities, including efforts to build local capacities to prevent conflict. A common finding from these programs across different countries is that, while progress is often evident during implementation, local reductions in violent conflict are later undermined by higher-level actors and processes. Often running parallel to these programs, and sometimes implemented by the same agencies with the same funding sources, are “livelihoods programs.” These vary considerably in their approach in pastoralist areas but, in one way or another, often focus on

livestock and related areas such as water development, livestock marketing, or natural resource management.

Variations in programming partly relate to diverse interpretations of the word “livelihood” and equally varied analysis around how livelihoods can be protected or strengthened. In aid circles, livelihoods thinking are associated with the emergence of livelihoods analysis in the late 1990s and an analytical approach called the sustainable livelihoods framework (Andy and Alula April 2010).

2.4 Historical background of Afar-Issa conflict

The conflict trends are inter-related and reinforce each other as drivers or consequences of other changes of demographics, livelihoods, change in the governance environment and change in other social dynamics. These events reflect the deep historical roots of inter-tribal conflicts and clan dynamics, which, over time, were exacerbated by trends such as land enclosure, commercial use of land, and the changing political environment. Conflict has continued to the present day with sporadic but explosive violence as well as smaller “drip” deaths and incidents such as livestock raiding. Some of these incidents have a distinctive pattern and are relatively predictable.

Early 1900s: Migration of Oromo Ittu into Mieso from western Hararghe highlands, to access grasslands for livestock production. Ittu were mainly pastoralists at this time. Construction of the Djibouti-Addis Ababa railway, with Issa from Djibouti employed as workers and guards who later occupied areas around the railway in what is now Shinile Zone.

Imperial Early 1930s: Government allocates around 500 ha of land in Mieso to two private investors for cultivation and livestock production; large pasture lands are fenced. Although armed guards used to protect the area, Ittu and Issa collaborated to destroy the farms and raided the animals.

October 1935, Italy attacked Ethiopia from Eritrea and Italian Somaliland. The Issa were recruited by the Italians and received modern arms and training, which they used against the Afar

to control parts of the Allighedi plain—a key grazing resource for livestock and with access to the Awash River.

Imperial 1960s: Government gives concessions to foreign and domestic investors along the Awash River for commercial irrigation, mainly cotton, without consultation or compensation to the Afar. Some Afar leaders also appropriate land for irrigation. Pastoralists lose access to large stretches of the river and dry season pastures, with impacts on livestock.

Imperial 1970-74: Commander of armed forces in eastern Ethiopia encourages Oromo and Afar to attack the Issa; gains from livestock raids distributed to raiders. Some Issa youth left the country. Both Issa and Afar very badly affected by drought and famine, without much assistance from government. Infant mortality of 615/1000 recorded among Issa during the 1974 famine (Seaman et al., 1978). Issa wells were reported to be deliberately poisoned by army, with livestock and human deaths; led to Issa and Oromo becoming enemies.

Socialist 1974 1974-1991: land reform with all land under state ownership. Landlords were dispossessed Mengistu and land instead allocated to Ittu; leading to a growing trend for private enclosure of land, i.e., the Ittu became more agro pastoral. The Issa resisted the expansion of cultivation, e.g., organized attacks during the planting and harvesting seasons to try to secure extensive communal grazing land.

Siad Barre regime in Somalia trains the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) in preparation for invasion of Ethiopia. Issa who had previously fled Ethiopia were organized by Hamud Farah. In 1977 they cooperated with Siad Barre in the war launched against Ethiopia and rejoined clan members in Ethiopia to fight against the Oromo and Afar, pushing deeper into Afar areas. Although Ethiopia repels the invasion in 1978, with Afar support, the Issa occupy settlements along the main Djibouti road, Gadamaitu and Adaitu. As well as trade and contraband, the Issa use the settlements as entry points for livestock movements further north into Afar. The period is characterized by supply of automatic weapons. The Oromo Ittu was supplied by the Ethiopian government; Somalia and Djibouti supply the Issa. In 1984 the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) is established, with leaders drawn from the WSLF.

EPRDF and Regional Autonomy and Afar Region. From 1991 to 2000: Formation of the Somali Regional State, bordered by Oromiya and Afar Regions, but with borders in key areas left Afar-Somali region—continued conflicts between the Afar and Issa, essentially resourced-based and around control of grazing resources and access to the Awash River. The Afar-Shinile Zone border remains unclear and Issa acquire a third settlement, Undofo, along the Djibouti main road. The occupation of the three settlements becomes a specific and intractable point of dispute between the two regional governments.

Negotiations continue between Afar and Somali regional governments over the border demarcation; Afar rejects proposal for the Issa-occupied settlements along the Djibouti road to be designated a “special woreda” under Afar Region. Plans announced to improve the road from Djibouti via Dewale, through Shinile Zone. This would create a main highway for Djibouti-Ethiopia traffic through official Issa areas. (*Riport of MOFA, 2010 or 2002E.C*)

2.5 The causal factor of Afar Issa conflict

Two major factors are making resources scarcer in Afar and putting many places which were previously accessible to Afars out of their reach. First, a wide-scale westward expansion of Issa-Somalis (here in after Issa) in the past seven to eight decades has displaced a number of Afar clans (particularly those who belong to the Weima tribe) from their traditional rangelands in West Hararghe (Getachew 2001; Gebre 2001).Issas are in our territory.They get military training in Djibouti to displace us from our fathers’ land.They were around Dire Dawa in the past but control most of our resources now.(Interview with Seko Mohammed Seid, Afar elder at Ambash, Amibara district, November 2006).

Similar ideas were reflected in many of the group discussions. A closer look at the qualitative data reveals that Afars have lost control of places such as Mulu, Erer, Afdem, and part of the Alaydeghi plain. Second, state development programs have increased the pressure on the Afars. A total of 375,219 hectares of prime Afar rangeland has been confiscated by the Ethiopian state for various purposes. (The Yangudirassa National Park, Alaydeghi Wildlife Reserve, West Awash Wildlife Reserve, Gewane Wildlife Reserve, Mille Serdo Wildlife Reserve, West Awash

Controlled Hunting Area, and several large-scale farms in the Middle Awash Valley constrict the Afars' access to rangeland resources.

Squeezed from different directions, the Afars became aggressively resistant against the Issas, which led to recurrent bloodshed between the two ethnic groups. More importantly; the rapid and coercive westward expansion of the Issa into territories historically controlled by Afars has reduced the possibility of peaceful resource sharing among the two groups. Alaydeghi, Blen, Buri and Andido are the major places of conflict with Issa pastoralists because of their better endowment of pastoral resources. The conflict is exacerbated by the prolonged and recurrent droughts the area has experienced, particularly, since the mid-1990s. For instance, a series of clashes occurred between the two groups in 2002 following the failure of the *sugum* rain that normally occurs in March and April (UN-EUE 2002a, 2002b; Markakis 2004).

The conflict during that time was quite serious and reached to the extent of blocking transportation between Ethiopia and Djibouti for some time. While the shrinking pastoral resource base is an important factor in explaining the Afar-Issa conflict, it is not the only one. Smuggling has also contributed much to the perpetuation of the conflict. Apart from its grazing resources, the eastern part of Afar is a smuggling route for caravans taking large quantities of manufactured goods (clothing, footwear, electronics, and pharmaceuticals) and food from the eastern borderlands of Ethiopia to Addis Ababa. For a long time the Afar people have benefited from their strategic location on this trade route by acting as middlemen between the coastal and hinter land traders as well as by direct involvement in the smuggling business (Getachew, 2001).

However, the Afars' gains from smuggling have attracted Issas who are also active in this field. Issas control two key smuggling centers (Gedamaitu and Adaitu) in the Afars' contested territory whereas Afars frequently inflict attacks on Issa to regain these strategic places. For instance, a series of clashes between the two groups over control of the trading centers were recorded in 2001 and 2002 (UN-EUE 2001; 2002a). For Issas, controlling the trading centers ensures free movement to transport smuggled goods between Ethiopia's two main import-export lines, the railway and the highway. For Afars, maintaining control over such strategic places not only ensures their income from the "underground economy" but also relaxes their access to

grazing resources especially during drought years. Therefore, for both groups, fighting is in this case mainly a matter of expanding their own “free zone” to maximize benefits from cross-border trade opportunities.

Another source of conflict between the two groups is the recurring livestock raiding. Issas not only fight for the rich pastoral resources and of smuggling centers in Afar territory, but also for the livestock that they can raid from Afars to sell immediately in domestic markets or export through illegal routes. Nor are Afars immune from the raiding “business.” Notable examples of livestock raids and counter-raids occurred in 2002: In June 2002, Issas raided more than 3,500 head of livestock from Afar and killed seven Afar herders. Organizing in response, the Afars went to Mulu market to save their animals from being sold, but were unsuccessful as the animals were taken to Djibouti by a different route. Four months later, young Afar men took retaliation against the Issa and sold a number of raided animals (the number not reported) at Bati market in Amhara region. This implies that livestock raiding between the two groups is a reciprocal “business” that sustains conflicts between them (Bekele, 2010).

2.6 Cultural Structures and Mechanisms for Peace

Many peace initiatives focus on external conflict triggers such as resource scarcity or market integration, while leaving aside the cultural factors that contribute to conflict. Although this may reduce the likelihood of conflict developing, it ignores the important underlying causes of conflict. In this section, case examples are used to show how cultural factors can be employed for conflict resolution. *Revenge, Compensation and Peace Accords* Many pastoralist societies have strong norms of revenge that are primarily responsible for escalating cycles of violence.

In cases of theft, injury or death, there may be significant cultural pressure for youth to engage in revenge attacks. Escalating conflicts are frequently mediated by external actors, and these sometimes result in the establishment of a peace accord between the conflicting parties. For accords to be successful, they need to be binding upon individuals who may otherwise desire revenge. To enable this, the underlying cultural norms for revenge should be addressed. This can be successfully accomplished with compensation for grievances in addition to – or in place of – rule of law sanctions, which frequently do not satisfy underlying cultural norms for revenge. When rule of law sanctions are employed without compensation, they may escalate conflict,

because revenge may then be targeted against the offender's family, or the offender may be subject to revenge upon their release from state confinement.

The employment of compensation as the backbone of successful peace accords is demonstrated by the Maikona Declaration between the Borena and Gebra in the Oromo regions of southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya.⁷ Elders from both groups were party to the agreement stipulating amounts of compensation to be paid in cases of theft, injury or death. For instance, if an individual steals an animal from a member of another group that is party to the declaration, that individual or his family then pays five livestock in compensation. This requirement of compensation reduces internal cultural pressure for revenge by providing a clear alternative that satisfies these norms without violence.

At the same time, it creates a disincentive to initiate conflict because of the likelihood of being required to pay compensation. Since this agreement was implemented in 2009 there has been a dramatic decrease in conflict deaths, primarily due to the absence of revenge attacks resulting from the payment of compensation. In a similar way, conflict resolution agreements will be more effective if they can satisfy internal cultural pressures that contribute to violence (Luke and Katta, 2012).

2.6.1. Informal Conflict Management Institutions

Conflicts between Afar clans are managed by the *madaa* based on Afar customary law. Members of the traditional jury are elders selected from different clans, excluding the clans involved in dispute. The process is called *billiarri*, which literally means peace-making. In the mediation process, the mediators focus on cooling off the parties by extending the length of the procedure until they settle their affairs by themselves. According to the elders in Ambash, traditional deliberations may take up to two weeks. Sanctions are not designed to punish the wrong doer. Instead, to use Rugege's expressions, the traditional mediators impose sanctions based more on the "give-little-and-take-little" principle than the "winner-takes-all" principle (1995).

The *madaa* has the authority and legitimacy to effectively enforce sanctions imposed by the traditional jury. Central to its effectiveness is the tradition of forgiveness among Afar clans,

respect for elders, and the transfer of resources as compensation. As a result, there are few cases in which conflicts between Afar clans escalate until they need the mediation of outsiders.

The *madaa* was able to effectively manage conflicts between Afars and some of their neighbors in the past (Getachew, 2001). For example, Afar and Karrayyu used to share institutions that enable them to exchange fugitives, pay compensation, and reduce tensions; i.e. if an Afar murdered a Karrayyu (or vice versa), a traditional jury composed of both ethnic groups would handle the case. However, though they still exist to some extent, these shared institutions are no longer influential. For Afar and Issa, the traditional framework for managing conflicts (as well enforcing agreements) is either latent or non-existent. In general, the *madaais* are now less effective at managing inter-ethnic conflicts.

2.6.2. Formal Conflict Management Institutions

The existence of well-functioning formal institutions (in addition to informal ones) may have two related benefits for societies (Knight 1992). First, the existence of formal institutions facilitates the introduction of third-party enforcers (mainly the state) and can help to stabilize informal institutions. Second, the introduction of formal institutions makes the institutional setup more complete and robust for handling diverse challenges and opportunities. In this respect, state-backed property rights and conflict management institutions can augment informal institutions in managing conflicts in pastoral areas

As a third-party rule enforcer, the state is expected to facilitate peaceful interaction between right-holders and duty-bearers. However, this is not the case in the study areas: the right-holders and the duty-bearers are often unknown, particularly in border areas. Meanwhile, high territorial demand is observed particularly for locations that have either better pastoral resources (such as the Alaydeghi plain and the vicinity of Mount Fentale) or strategic importance for exploiting trade opportunities (such as Gedamaitu and Adaitu). Afars move into contested areas without the consent of their neighbors because they believe that these areas are within their territorial domain. Their neighbors also do not hesitate to take countervailing actions that usually lead to bloody confrontations. The actions of the local administrations are limited to precautionary tactics such as establishing offices in contested areas to safeguard future claims of their people.

At higher levels, conflicts are understated and are usually considered as temporary conflicts over pasture and water rather than a struggle between groups for permanent territorial control. In several policy documents the Ethiopian government has acknowledged the complexity of pastoral challenges and called for certain critical interventions to improve the livelihoods of pastoral communities. However, conflict and its management have received marginal attention, if mentioned at all, in many of the contemporary policy documents. For instance, while eight articles (out of 104) in the food security strategy of 1996 discuss pastoral areas; none of them mentions the importance of conflict management in these areas (FDRE 1996). Even the most recent policy document, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program, envisages no systematic way of managing conflicts in pastoral areas (FDRE 2002).

Despite this fact, government and development agencies intervene in conflict mediations on an *ad hoc* basis. Actually, most of the inter-ethnic conflicts within three years preceding this study were mediated in the presence of the government and the NGOs operating in the area (such as CARE Ethiopia). The mediation forums were held in urban centers in the presence of traditional leaders and government officials, where the latter took leadership on the stage. The meetings lasted two to three days depending upon the complexity of the cases and the damages involved. The government and the NGOs provided logistics to bring the conflicting parties together (Bekele, 2010).

2.7 Pastoralist competence

Pastoralists across all study sites and social groups characterized a secure and successful livelihood as one in which individuals and households have the capabilities and agency to build up and manage assets, make demands, secure and give support and adapt to changing conditions. We translated this as ‘competence’. It is recognizable in people’s mobility, visibility and good behavior; moving to the right watering hole and grazing places at the right time, bringing up children and managing the household well, being seen doing business in town and in the market, speaking effectively at clan meetings and with officials. Contrary to mainstream views of pastoralism as essentially a backward and impoverished livelihood, mobility linked to livestock rearing is perceived as a prerequisite for competence, wealth and livelihood security as a pastoralist. Pastoralists’ competence is perceived to be under increasing stress due to three key

factors: borders, land policy and conflict. These factors are interrelated and affect households and clans in different ways depending on levels of wealth, and competence. Whilst the majority of pastoralists are still perceived to be competent, levels of wealth are seen to be declining. An apparently increasing number of households are unable to cope with livelihood shocks and stresses and are ‘dropping out’ of pastoralism: living on the edge of towns unable to effectively reconnect to the clan. Decline in individual competence destabilizes the clan’s collective competence and capacity to maintain and sustain the pastoralist way of life.

2.8 Government responses and information flows

As more pastoralist areas become incorporated into the state delivery system through the creation of new *woredas*, the extent, effectiveness and influence of these channels grows. Increasingly, a form of hybridization between systems is emerging as this incorporation continues and as pastoralists seek to access basic services from the *kebele* and *woreda* and look for other forms of representation at higher levels that will allow more successful state engagement. At the *kebele* level, for the Borana and Guji, for example, the clan system meets the government through the election of *jaars* members to the *kebele* council or as cabinet members. This provides one channel for pastoralists into the governmental system and vice-versa .

Changes in the connections between pastoralist systems and government are rooted in the history of their engagement, a history which is described at greater length. During the Derg period between 1974 and 1991 customary institutions began to lose some of their powers; with the regime intervening with customary leadership and dismissing leaders that challenged their authority. After the overthrow of the Derg regime, the EPRDF consolidated its position within the country. In pastoral areas EPRDF took a different route to engaging with the population than in other areas of the country, clan leaders became their intermediaries and operated as ‘co-opted’ partners. As Vaughan notes (2003), this use of elites (quite contrary to policy elsewhere) was an acceptance that the only way into these systems and populations was through the conduit of the pastoralist elites themselves. Working through the pastoralist clans was recognition of the ‘separateness’ of pastoralists from the usual systems of state control. This long established approach continues today in the study *woredas* with a clear and recognized ‘partnership’ between the state and clan leaders.

2.9 Conflict over resources with Afar

Afdem and Miesoworedas are remote woredas farthest from Dire Dawa and Shinille zone. Afdemworeda has arid and semi-arid land in the north and western parts. One can also see bushy and mountainous plains along the south and eastern parts of the woreda. It shares a border with Afar and Oromiya regions but they are ill defined and often cause conflict over resources. Most of the areas in the woredas are inaccessible due to poor road infrastructure and the people have few business relationships with other parts of the zone.

The UN-EUE mission observed a lot of dead cattle in Gedamaytu (Miesoworeda), and Unduftu (Afdemworeda). While these losses are due to water and pasture shortage, the main reason is the recent conflict between the Afar and the Issa. The latest conflict broke out when the Afar attacked the Issa who were around the Awash River and the Afar stole about 400 cattle from the Issas. Accordingly, quite a number of Issas lost access to traditional water points and grazing lands. In Gedamaytu, the traditional water sources of the Issa used to be around Keleale in Adaitou but now the Afar have occupied the place and therefore the Issa have been forced to leave and relocate to Dawadit, west of Unduftu, where little water and pasture is available.

According to the Issa community leaders, they can only survive a few weeks in Dawadit, then they will have to come back to Keleale. Hence, renewed clashes are already predicted. There are about 30 privately owned birkeds (cemented underground water tanks) in Gedamaytu town. Traditionally water used to be brought from Awash Arba (within Afar region, see annexed map) to fill up the birkeds and the villagers had access to water in their localities. However, due to the recent conflict with Afar, they no longer have access to water from Awash Arba.

About 17 kilometres from Unduftu town, in a place called Seele, approximately 1000 Issa households are residing. These people traditionally used to live along the Awash River for many years. Three months ago, however, they had to leave, pushed by the Afar following a shortage of water and pasture in the surrounding area. The Issa retreated and temporarily settled in Unduftu area. Most of them have lost their animals around Awash River during the conflict three months ago. Now there is no water and pasture where they are staying and many cattle died. According

to a pastoralist resident, about 100 cattle died in this locality. Children are now begging for water from truck drivers and other trespassers on the main road that crosses from Awash to Mille in Afar region.

2.9.1 Uncontrolled increase in livestock and population settlements leads to social conflict

Water sources in the visited areas include wells, rivers and birkeds. Usually wells are controlled and managed by clan elders and birkeds are owned by individuals who control the use of water. Clans often control grazing land but clan territories are not clearly demarcated. Therefore whenever the Issas are in short supply of water and grazing land, they penetrate into Afar territory and vice versa. The main reason for pressure on water and grazing land and conflict between the two ethnic groups is the important increase in the livestock population over past years. According to elders and other key informants, the number of livestock has been increasing over the years partly because of increasing water sources. The development of more water points has also attracted population settlements around those places. This has led to shortage of grazing land. Some scholars, however, argue that the uncertain climatic conditions in arid areas have a controlling effect on the size of the livestock population (Sugule, 1998).

The most recent clashes between Afar and Issa people along the main Awash-Mille road is the result of cumulative clashes over scarce resources. Many Issas who are living in Gedamaytu stressed that the Afar have built buildings in those areas where the Issa graze and water their cattle (Piguet, 2002). Consequently, the Issa are pushed away to the other side of the road and they are forced to graze their cattle in less productive areas. An example of existing tension between Afar and Issa people is illustrated in Unduftu where a road construction company based in the locality decided to dig water wells to benefit local residents. Unfortunately, the company has been threatened by the Afar and the activity was stopped. The water pump is now not functional for lack of maintenance

2.9.2 Repercussion on livestock and pastoral livelihood

Cattle and shoat milk production has sharply declined. Interviewed pastoralists have said that no milk is available. Cattle are emaciated, no grazing land is available and hence livestock is in poor

health condition. An important impact of the current drought on camels can also be seen by looking at the interval time between drinking.

The decline in milk availability and poor health of cattle has direct implications on pastoral livelihoods. Though it has been difficult to quantify the number of dead cattle in the area⁴, the mission has observed substantial number of dead animals particularly in Afdem and Miesoworedas of Gedamaytu and Unduftu. This definitely erodes the coping mechanisms of pastoralists and their livelihood.

Unless immediate action is taken to solve the water and grazing problem, people will be forced to buy highly priced water, if they can at all as many people have depleted their assets and do not have any cash left. Particularly those with only a few cattle are the most vulnerable. Interviewed elders have stressed that people who are settled in villages are more vulnerable than nomads as it is difficult for them to move in search of alternative water points.

CHAPTER THREE: THE STUDY AREA

Introduction

As Clement Adibe (1995:102) argues “understanding the nature of the society and the cause(s) of the conflict is a sine qua non for finding a solution.” With no brief look at the socio-economical and political variables among the conflicting groups, it might be less easy to analyze the multifaceted conflict between the Afar and Issa/Somali. Hence, the next subsequent subsections describe the socio-economic and political features of the two pastoral societies besides brief etymological explanations.

3.1 The Afar

3.1.3. Socio-economic settings of the Afar People

The Afar is a pastoral society that survived for centuries by adapting and perfecting a lifestyle of nomadic *pastoralism*, more or less constantly moves with its livestock from one grazing area and water point to another depending on the availability of the resources. *Nomadism* is taken as a means of coping up with the dry and fragile environment. Hence, Afar pastoralists are follow transhumance from one grazing area and watering points to another depending on the availability of resources. The Afar pastoralists usually make temporary settlement points, although they will never abandon the original or base encampment. The Afar pastoralists have good communication traditions, which they call *Dagu* that enable men patrolling scouts (*Gibba*) for mapping out places of seasonal movements to access resources as well as to take timely interaction between temporarily separated families. Bondestam (1974:426) argued that the Afar are not nomads, but most of them stay near the river during the dry September-May season, and move only once a year to more distant areas. They are, therefore, heavily dependent on grazing close to the river.

3.1.4 Traditional Political Structure of the Afar

The Afar people have had an independent traditional political system, which possessed clearly defined geographic boundaries. The traditional authorities like 'Amoy tas, Dar dars, Redan tus, Momins and Makabantus are the highest political authorities representing individual tribes and/or numerous tribal confederacies. As cited in historical sources UKA listed some of the

ancient kingdoms represented in Doba'a near to the Awsa, kingdom of Dulum, the kingdom of Dankali in Baylul, the kingdom of Ankala in BayteRahaito and the kingdom of HarakBodoyta in KhorAngar. Even though these ancient kingdoms have been gradually declined, the age-old traditional political structure exists yet in the Afar territory. The well recorded Sultanates of Rahaita, Ta ura, Awasa, Bidu, Gobaad as well as that of Dawe are yet functional along with various the tribal confederacy Councils like AwookeeAala, Debenek We 'ima etc.

These traditional political authorities administered their society through their traditional customary law. As Gemaluddin (1998:35) claimed, "be it in the five sultanates or in the numerous tribal chieftaincies, the Afars are administered by customary laws known as MADA which are processed through litigation or law-suit known as MABLO."

The law court is called HARA the jury is called MAKAAABAN. Although different regions of the Afar triangle have MADAs of their own; they differ only in minor aspects. The well-known madas are Burilimada (Burili's code of laws), Budditobarihmada (Buddito's son's code of law) and the Debnk- We 'imamada (Debnk – We 'ima's code of law). Even though, the Afars straddle in different political borders as a result of the scramble for Africa and adhere by the law of their respective countries, yet traditional authorities have a significant influence even superior than the national rules and regulations.

3.2 Issa/Somali

3.2.1 Socio-economic settings of Issa/Somali

Unlike their pastoral neighbors, however, Issa pastoralists inhabit arid and semi arid areas of the region in which the environment is fragile, harsh and inhospitable. Even though water points and rangeland areas are controlled through tribal ownership among Somalis, no other Somali tribe could be excluded to use either the wells or grazing areas. As stated by Lewis M. (1961: 75) "pasturage is regarded as a gift of God to man in general, or rather to Somalis, and is not considered to belong to specific groups. Generally, people and stock are most deployed after the rains when the grazing is fresh and green; while in the dry seasons they are forced to concentrate nearer the wells and make do with what grazing can be found in their proximity." In the particular case of the Issa/Somalis Lewis M. (ibid) confirmed that "Ise insist most strongly,

perhaps more strongly than other northern Somali that the land which they occupy is far for the purpose of grazing open to the livestock of all 'Ise without respect to their lineage affiliation." In describing the seasonal mobility of the Issa/Somali tribes, Lewis M.(1994:90) indicated that "the centers of population are the home wells to which in *Haga*[dry season July-August] and *Dhair*[November-December] tribes retire from the far grazing, and from which in *Jilal*[January-February], they move out to the new pasture after the *Gu*[April-May] rains. In the dry season tribes are concentrated round the home wells, which are often shared among friendly tribes." Apart from the pastoral livelihood, Somalis are actively involved in trade. As confirmed by Lewis M. (1994:128-9)"most travelers who have recorded their impressions of Somali character have noted the acute commercial sense of the Somali, [...] Somali certainly seek to profit from financial transactions and would endorse the view that money talks, that wealth is power, and as such is highly desirable. And Somali are very much alive to the exploitable resources of another." These business-oriented attitude among the Somali in general and that of the Issa in particular can be traced centuries back as the area they inhabited were the main route for trade transaction along the coasts and hinterlands of the Horn region.

By the 19th century they effectively controlled the corridor and participated in its commercial traffic." Among all activities, the well-known Abban trade was the major source of income to the Issa/Somali since centuries back. As Lewis M. (1994:114-5) suggested "the segmentary nature of Somali society with its many lineages often at war, and with no central authority to which common appeal could be made, had its repercussions in the organization of the caravan trade. To reach the coast in safety a caravan had to have protection on its journey among many different and often hostile clans. The leader of the caravan of laden burden camels entered into a relationship of protection with those amongst whom he passed on his way to the coast. A patron was selected for his probity, status, and above all in a society where force is all important, for the strength of his lineage. The position of protector is called the *abban* (may derive from the word *ab* or *aabbe*, father) is given gifts in return for his services. Having agreed to act in this capacity, the patron is responsible for the security of the caravan under his protection, for its good and for the lives of those with it." Harris (1844:40-1) confirmed the role of Aban in the Patron-protege relationship in the 19th century trade activity in the region.

3.3 Shared Norms and Values between the Afar and Issa/Somali Pastoralists

It would not be troublesome for a layman to figure out number of common features among the Afar and Issa/Somali people. As stated by Touval (1963: 22) “There are similarities between some Issa and Danakil [Afar] clans.” Apart from being an old neighborhood, the Afar and Issa/Somali have many cultural features in common. While describing the socio-economic and political settings of both societies in the previous subsection, its well indicated that both ethnic groups are tribal-based egalitarian societies with similar hierarchy of society (see figure 1) who are entirely adherents of the faith of Islam and share similar pattern of population movements, settlements as well as myths of genealogical connections in one way or another to the qurush tribe of the Prophet Mohammed. Afar and Issa/Somali further share common pastoral values, traditional institutions, customary laws, ecological characteristics, colonial experiences, and a common historical legacy of isolation, victimization and underdevelopment. Braukamper

(2007) stipulated even similarity in their house construction. As a matter fact, Lewis M. (1961:79) has also correlated the pastoral seasonal movements with that of their house construction by stating as “Peoples in the arid lowlands of the Ogaden and the Afar Triangle are largely camel nomads who need to be very mobile. Their dwellings have to be transportable and therefore constructed and dismantled quickly.”The autonomous authority the clan chiefs had over their constituents was also another similar feature what the Afar and Somali society shared. As cited in Drysdale (1966:13) “Gastaldi’s sixteenth century neither map of North Eastern Africa, together with the texts of Francesco Alvares’ travels, testify to the independent status of the Somali and Dankali littoral and hinterland at that period in history; nor is there subsequent historical evidence that the Danakil and Somali coasts have ever formed ‘part and parcel’ of Ethiopia.”

The Afar and Issa/Somali shared similar population movement patterns too. Abir (1980: 75) stipulated that “it is most likely that for an extended period they inhabited the area to the south and southeast of the Ethiopian Rift Valley lakes and that the Somali and Dankali migrated with their herds from south to north rather than from north to south. This migration was probably triggered off by population growth and the insufficiency of grazing land and, finally, mounting

pressure of Galla tribes, who had begun their twopronged expansion, it seems, in the fifteenth century.”Even in regards to the mythical north-south migration, both groups claim to be descendents of the south Arabian influx as well as descendant of the Quriash of Mecca.

Indeed there are some who claims that Issa is the son of HadalMahis. Similar to the claim by some Afar tribes like Daheimela and Welwelu who trace their origin from the Darod branch of Somali, Issa clans like Urweyne, Horone, Harla, Walaldon and Wardik are also cited by oral traditions of the Afar and in some cases within the Issa themselves to be from Afar origin. Moreover, Afar elders claims that there are substantial number of Issas adopted within Afar clans for different reasons. For instance, Lewis M. (1955:160) stated that “the Ad Saleh, inhabiting the islands of Abbaguba and Baca in the bay of Hawakil, are recent Somali Mijertein immigrants (about a hundred years).They were formerly bound to the Mijertein of Somaliland but have severed that connection and allied themselves with Damoheita of Buri.”Isenberg and his associates have also indicated the historical relationship between some Afar tribes and that of Issa/Soamli.

According to (Isenberg et al.1968: 41)“The We’ema Danakil maintain about 100 Somal bowmen, who have been taken from various Somal tribes, and are now naturalized among them: they still preserve, however, their Somal tongue, and marry among themselves, without intermixing with the Danakils. The Danakils regard shooting as unlawful and therefore employ the Somals in it. They seem to carry on bloody wars sometimes among themselves.” According to elders from both societies Weima/Afars used to have agreement with Issa/Somalis not to fight each other but to share what they got by looting other Somali or Afar clans. Moreover, according to the Afar’s oral tradition, Issa/Somalis were used to offer girls to Weimas. Thus there is a local discourse that the Fekirtho and Awedo among the Weima/Afars have blood relations with the Issa. Furthermore, the Fidihihi clan of Afar [in SidhaBura] has an afbeha that is a very close friendly relation with some Issaclans. HaysemaleAfars inhabit around Awash-7 and Awash-40 areas, according to elders’ confirmation, have some Issa/Somali clans live under their protection. On the other hand around Haysemale Comma, a mountain near to Djibouti territory, the oral tradition affirmed that there are Afars of Able who went to Issa long ago and became Issa/Able and during Afar and Issa/Somali conflict the Able/Issas fight the Afars along siding Issas.

There were also alliances between Issa/Somali and southeastern Afar Debne confederation who occupied the western and northern territories of the city of Zeila since the first decade of the second half of the 17th century to protect the city of the Oromo invasion from the plateau of Harrar and from Somali nomads incursions from southern coast after the decline of the original southern Afars, few of them are living now in Awsa, particularly in Afambo Woreda. As affirmed by Harris (1844) and Isenberg et al. (1968) “the Issa were the Debne allies first against the Oromo and after against the Modayto of Awsa sultanate.” They were also working for the Debne as goat-keepers. The songs of Horra of Debne women further confirm this alliance. The title of this song is ‘Da’arbornarre’ (Daqar Boor naarre) means ‘We are migrating to the plateaus.’³² Morin affirmed the claim that Debne/Afars had an alliance with Issa/Somali against the Afar of Awsa. As cited in Morin (2007c: 90) “oral tradition explains that Hummad b. Lo’oyta wanted to use the French to extend the influence of the Debne over Awsa itself-a project already followed by his father. Due to a conflict with the Asahyammara of Ba’adu in 1886 he helped Dagazmach Mekonen Welde Mikael in a raid against Ba’adu. Hummad was also said to have encouraged the Issa in their attacks against Awsa.”

Isenberg et al. (1968:44- 5) further confirmed the above stated claim by stating as “in their wars, the Debenik We’emas always make common cause with the Issa Somalis against the Mudaitus, in which event the Issa Somalis amount to one third of their number.” They [Issa] are on pretty good terms with the Debenik We’emas (Ibid: 38). As added by Dubois (2005b:816) at times, alliances between the Afar from Goba’ad and the Issa devoted against the powerful sultanate of Awsa were also secured. Al-Shami / Al-Shami (1997: 455) wrote as “in June 1867 Sultan Mohammed Hanfare invaded Issa/Somali and Debne/Afar tribes.” Thus according to some Afars, Issa/Somali occupied peacefully the arid regions abandoned by the Afars.³³ However, there is also a local discourse among the Issa/Somalis that they pushed the Afars from Zayla as a result of successive wars. Apart from alliance during wars, Issa/Somali have similar cultural values sometimes close to the Afar’s than other Somali clans. For example the well-known Afar’s rugby game called *Afar Koassois* also a famous cultural game among the Issa/Somalis. As cited in Lewis M. (1961:76-8) “a game which [‘Ise] share with some sections of the Gadabursi but which is not as far as I am aware found elsewhere in northern Somaliland. This is a form of touch rugby called *go’ons* played with a ball approximately equal numbers [of teams]. Alike

rule of the game in the Afar Koasso injuries sustained in the game which is as lively as rugby do not entitle the injured person to claim damages.”Furthermore, Lewis M. (1955:25) suggests that “the warriors of both tribes (Esa and Gadabursi) are distinguished from those of other Somali by the characteristic vertical scars they bear on the cheeks or forehead; in addition to the normal Somali weapons, they have strong and dangerous slings.” Similarly the Afars also have a culture of making vertical scars on their cheeks and carry strong knife called *Gille*. Indeed, it needs detail anthropological study to clarify local discourses about the ancestral link with the Afar and Issa/Somali people. Despite all the above mentioned shared values, norms and strategic alliances they had, today the relation between the two pastoral groups deteriorating gradually and reached to a level of severe hostility among each other.

CHAPTER FOUR

4.1 Research Methodology

The study relied on both the qualitative and the quantitative methods. The quantitative method used here is the survey method. Qualitative approach helps to study the attitude and perception of the community to wards conflict over resources between the pastoralist's communities and its consequences on their livelihood in the study area. It required the investigator to engage with the person and the events which offers particular value in the process of generating new concepts or theories. It seeks to provide full and accurate description of phenomena in all their complexity. It used to analysis the broad questions and problems narrowly and to deal with small samples and uniqueness. And also it attempts to discover and show the assumptions that underlie events or actions related to conflict in the study area.

In addition to this quantitative approach would be was used to get extensive information by help of statically analysis, table and figures. It focuses more on testing of existing theories of generalizations related to conflict in the study area and to reveal or establish cause and effect relationships among Conflict over resource between the pastoralist communities and its consequence on their livelihood on the case of Afar-Issa Conflict in Amibara Woreda Afar Regional State .

Important things to be discussed here are the sampling technique, sample size and techniques of data collection using the questionnaires.

4.1.1 Research Design

In the fact that the study was to explain the complex aspects of Afar and Issa/Somali conflict from the perspective of consequence on resource competition, livelihood status, territorial and power politics of the community as well as review of conflict theories and concepts means that the approach will have to be analytical. Then again, it is a necessity to consider the characteristics of both the Afar and the Issa/Somali pastoralist groups. In this case, socio cultural and politico-economic characteristics of both societies were studied. Such an approach is basically descriptive. The study therefore used both analytical and descriptive research designs.

4.1.2 Types and source of Data

The type of this study is descriptive because it describes the cause of conflict over resource between the pastoralist communities and its consequence on their livelihood. The researcher in this study intentionally used this type of study so that it helped to gather relevant information to the stated problems and achieve the stated objectives and source of data used on the study were both primary and secondary. The primary information was collected using self-constructed questionnaires, focus group discussion, document analysis and interview from concerned individual. While secondary information is collected from different books, journals, newspaper, internet and other sources prepared for a different purpose.

4.1.3 Population

The total number of households in Amibaraworeda was about 13,975. For Gedamaytukebele was 900. 150 households were selected as a sample. This is done to make the research more manageable and concrete.

4.1.4 Sampling frame

A sampling frame was developed by collected population data from key informants. Pastoralists generally had a good and up-to-date understood of environment, climate, market conditions and population movements. The community itself was provided the necessary information compiled a list of the potential primary sampling units. A primary sampling unit was the first level of subdivision of the population, which was based on selecting a part of the population for further sub-sampling. In that case the primary sampling unit was comprised one or more identifiable groups of households were moved together with their livestock. The list of households that were registered in the woreda administration office was the sampling frame of the study. In the selected kebele about 900 households were the sample frame of the study.

4.1.5 Sample size

The primary concern of the study was included representatives and adequate numbers of sample. A total of 150 household heads were selected for this study out of 900 household live in the study area. For qualitative part focus group discussion and key informant interview were held with woreda administration heads, experts who worked for administration and peace office, clan leaders and elders to keep the representativeness of the sample.

4.1.6 Sampling Technique

The primary concern of the study was included representatives and adequate numbers of sample size for a meaning full analysis. There were a total of 900 households in the study area. Of these, 150 households were selected for this study. For such social science study, the sample size determination is based on different reference books suggestion 10-15% sample size from the total household is preferred. For qualitative part, it is based on the estimated average size of the community were answered; the overall goal and objectives might saturate and near to precision for the estimated prevalence under conflict. For focus group discussion and interview the representatives were 2 group from woreda administration, 2 group from experts who worked for administration and peace office, 3 group were clan leaders, 3 group were elders, totally 10 FGD representatives were selected.

4.1.7 Sampling unit

The sampling units was residence households in the community, elders, clan leaders, political party members, administration officials, young people, women, local administrative officials and experts who were worked for government offices in the study area.

4.1.8 Data collection Tools

Basically questionnaire, interview, document analysis and focused group discussion were used to gather key information. In addition, books, journals, articles and internet have been used to gather important information for the study. The questionnaire was both open and closed ended type.

The second tool that was used for the study was interview. It was presented to the elders, clan leaders, religious leaders, woreda and kebele administration official's. The interview was prepared on the cause of conflict over resource between pastoralist communities and its consequence on their livelihood in aforementioned weredas.

To strengthen the finding of the study 10 focus group respondents were selected from Afar and Issa ethnic group and participated in the focus group discussion. The selected respondents were ; elders, 3 groups of clan leaders, 2 groups of religion leaders, woreda and kebele administration officials women's & youth and 3 group of peace and justice office to verify real existence of the population and promote understanding of participants perspective.

Through the consultation of woreda administration leaders, the researcher was examined documents related to conflict, institutional sources such as incident reports, statistics, joint peace

committee minutes , local agreements, regular quarterly and annual reports, based on Afar-Issa conflict prepared by MOFA .

4.1.9 Method of data analysis

The entire questionnaire designing that is used to perform the general analysis of the research. Data obtained from house hold questionnaire survey was analyzed by manual system whenever possible with the convenience of the researcher. FGD and interview data were also analyzed qualitatively according to the thematic areas.

CHAPTER FIVE: RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Introduction

This chapter is focus on the interpretation and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data. Data collected, by following the methodology presented, were exposed to various analyses in line to research objective to accomplish. This research explore the techniques used in identifying dimensions conflict over resource between the pastoralist community and its consequence on their livelihood, and analyzing data associated with demographic profile of the respondents.

With an objective to assess the impact and its associated factors of conflict over resource and livelihood in pastoralist community in the case of Afar - Issa Conflict in Amibaraworeda , Afar Regional State. Conflict in the study area a total of 129 or 86 % were collected back as completely filled and retained for further analysis. The remaining 21 (14 %) respondents were incomplete filled due to different reasons like unwillingness to respond and filled back to me, incomplete tailed, carelessness, were not punctual and others .

5.1 Socio demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

From a total of 150 samples, 129 participants were giving a response, with a response rate of 86 %. The socio-demographic features of the participants are shown in Table-1. Nearly **82.95%** of the respondents(69.77% from urban &13.18 % from rural) were male. Majority of the respondents were Somali (37.21%) followed by Afar(25.58 %)by ethnicity and majority of the respondents were Muslim (59.09%) by religion and the majority of the respondents were pastoralist followed by government employees 51.94 % and 24.81 % respectively

Table 1 – Socio demographic status of respondents, Ambar woreda, Afar regional state

NQ	variable	SEX				Total	%	
		M ,n=107	%	F ,n=22	%			
1	Residence					n=129		
		Rural	17	13.18	5	3.88	22	17.05
		Urban	90	69.77	17	13.18	107	82.95
Total			107	82.95	22	17.05	129	100.00
2	Age	20-30	18	13.95	4	3.10	22	17.05
		31-40	38	29.46	8	6.20	46	35.66
		41-50	32	24.81	8	6.20	40	31.01
		Above 50	19	14.73	2	1.55	21	16.28
		Total		107	82.95	22.00	17.05	129.00
3	Ethnicity	Amhara	15	11.63	4	3.10	19	14.73
		Tigre	11	8.53	1	0.78	12	9.30
		Afar	31	24.03	2	1.55	33	25.58
		Somali	37	28.68	11	8.53	48	37.21
		Oromo	13	10.08	4	3.10	17	13.18
				0.00		0.00	0	0.00
Total			107	82.95	22.00	17.05	129.00	100.00
4	Educational status	Illiterate	27	20.93	10	7.75	37	28.68
		Read and write	29	22.48	5	3.88	34	26.36
		Elementary 1st cycle	12	9.30	1	0.78	13	10.08
		Elementary 2nd cycle	5	3.88	2	1.55	7	5.43
		High school 9-10	7	5.43	2	1.55	9	6.98
		Preparatory	9	6.98	0	0.00	9	6.98
		TVT	5	3.88	0	0.00	5	3.88
		College or university	13	10.08	2	1.55	15	11.63
		Total			107	82.95	22.00	17.05

5	Religion	Muslim	64	49.61	13	10.08	77	59.69
		Orthodox	30	23.26	7	5.43	37	28.68
		Protestant	13	10.08	2	1.55	15	11.63
Total			107	82.95	22.00	17.05	129.00	100.00
6	Marital status	Never married	29	22.48	6	4.65	35	27.13
		Married	68	52.71	16	12.40	84	65.12
		Divorced	10	7.75	0	0.00	10	7.75
Total			107	82.95	22.00	17.05	129.00	100.00
7	Occupation	Government employ	27	20.93	5	3.88	32	24.81
		Merchants	19	14.73	3	2.33	22	17.05
		Pastoralists	54	41.86	13	10.08	67	51.94
		Other	7	5.43	1	0.78	8	6.20
Total			107	82.95	22.00	17.05	129.00	100.00

Source : own Survey, 2016

5.2 Historical cause and source of Conflict in Afar-Issa Pastoralist Community

The pattern of conflict in Afar –Issa community is multifaceted; with several factors contributing to the conflicts. These causes may vary from tendencies of competition over scarce material resources, to aspirations of being dominant inter-group forces, to geographical, Psycho-cultural historical feelings or biases of non-complimentarily, to tensions induced by extra group factors such as different forms of state intervention, resource disaffection, Political-oppressions

However, this study showed that the competition over resource especially access to drinking water and grazing land is the supreme cause of conflict in the study area. Simply ignoring pastoralist areas can lead to weak or harmful livelihoods diversification, including activities which may hurt the physical environment and social fabric of society; when people respond to limited livelihoods options by resorting to illegal or environmentally damaging activities, this can cause or perpetuate local conflicts. The respondents for more conveniently agreed that the root cause and associative factors are more relatedly coming from competition over resource;

need to expand territory, forces coming from external invasion and others like prolonged drought and poverty.

Table 2: **The root Cause and associated factors for conflict**

	Number of respondents	Percent
Competition over resource (Grazing land & access to water)	97	75.19
Need to expand tertiary	14	10.86
External invasion	10	7.75
Others (drought & Poverty)	8	6.20

Source: Survey 2016

The major reason for the conflict between the two tribes, as shown in the above table is competition over resources. As both tribes are pastoralists and highly depend on animal farming and grazing land, there is always competition in taking and using such scarce resources. The need for grazing land and access to water was found to be the major reasons for the conflict between the two tribes: Afar and Issa. In addition to this, the discussion from the FGD and key informant interview showed that inappropriate development policies and strategies can fuel conflicts; like the construction of new facilities such as water points in conflict-sensitive locations and the unlawful allocation of pastoralist land for agriculture.

According to respondent survey and interviewer point of view, above 92.25% of respondents said that the major source and cause of conflict in Afar and Issa pastoralist community are resources like seasonal variation in grazing land and water resources; peaks in resource competition, drought and boundary expansion mainly to the side of Somali. The remaining 7.75% respondents also said that external invasion, armed organization coming soon and spreading of illegal weapons is the main cause.

Factors, as many as number human casualty of the conflict, could be mentioned. However, only very few were well explained free from bias and irrational predisposition. says, ostensible expressions power asymmetry land and territorial annexation as reflection, basically resource as

underpinning cause fueling conflicts and contributing factors related to geo-political, historical and cultural factors were taken in composite to explain the case at hand.

5.3 Root cause /Factors of Afar-Issa conflict

Despite the root factors such as historical population movements, cultural values and aggressive economic resource competitions that cause conflict between the Afar and Issa, changes in regional political order have an escalation impact of conflict as well. Studies done by D/r Yasin,2002 indicated that the arrivals of French and Italian colonial powers in the Horn as well as the creation of new states in the region (Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea) during the postcolonial era have notably affected the intensity and escalation of the conflict. Furthermore, the collapse of Barre's and Mengestu's regimes, successive interstate disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea as well as Eritrea against Djibouti together with the anti-terrorism campaign in the African Horn are among the major regional political orders that have influenced and transformed the age-old traditional disputes between the Afar and Issa into veritable ethno territorial as well as hostile politico-economic power rivalry.

Host government of Ethiopia considers the conflict between the Afar and Issa as either a mere internal dispute between two pastoral groups over grass and water. Over simplifying the conflict by using either a simple 'grass and water' logic led stakeholders to over look major characteristic of the conflict, which was the regional dimension. Conflicts were also easily taken on cross-border dimensions, both internally, in terms of the administrative demarcation borders of districts and sub-districts, and externally, in terms of national borders." Predominantly, for conflicts among geographically straddled ethnic groups of the Afar and Issa, a thorough analysis of conflict over resource between the pastoralist community and its consequence on their livelihood in relation to causes and phases of the conflict should be a major task to grasp the anatomy of this conflict.

Apart from the role of culture and pattern of mobility, economic elements have also ignited the conflict between the Afar and Issa. Both societies have similar livelihood of transhumance pastoralism, evading unfavorable climatic condition and follow a seasonal migratory pattern that has long been recognized as an effective way for searching pasture and water. Thus, competition over increasingly scarce resources in a hostile environment had been a common source of

conflict. Issa had greater ambition to reach on the basin of the Awash River either by pushing the Afars away or concluding a communal use agreement.

Furthermore, getting access to markets for livestock and illicit goods could be regarded as another economic factor that causes the conflict. As cited in Yohannes et al. (2005:7) there is also increasing evidence of the commercialization of cattle raiding, which now involves local administrations, unemployed individuals and even the police. Conflict can occur when rustled livestock is traded on and the original owners of the livestock regard the transaction as illegitimate.

5.3.1 Aggravating Factors of the Afar- Issa Conflict

Aside from major root causes of the Afar-Issa conflict such as, socio demographic, cultural, politico-economical, ecological as well as regional political dynamics; internal features in the politico-economic sphere of the host states are also major catalysts that aggravate and prolong the conflict to more severe and complex level it reaches at present.

5.3.2. Examinations of Conflict Accelerators and Actors within Amibara Woreda

As survey conducted in the woreda, indicated that the conflict accelerators and actors above 94 % covers like resource computation, demarcation, external armed group and illegal weapons expansion. Whereas 6% covers related the prolonged drought ,livestock raid and living condition and method of the community.

The conflict accelerating factors as well as the actors involved in the Afar and Issa conflict were increased alarmingly as the conflict getting intensified and sophisticated. The practice of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is yet a matter of debate, arguing whether it's a remedy or a curse for long existed ethnic discontents within the country. Leaving the 'fruit enjoying' or the 'future threat' aside, one can definitely observe rapidly increasing of inter-ethnic conflicts all through the region as well as in the country. Again it could be argued that at this initial stage of exercising ethnic federalism, identity based confrontations might be an expected phenomenon until the envisaged development is realized.

However, the question was how could a country reached to its development goal while the ethnic rivalries become intensified and being a major obstacle for executing development endeavors.

Thus in this case the conflict becomes the hindrance for the development, which is supposed to be the final remedy for conflicts. Therefore, critical analysis of conflicts and attempt potential resolution mechanisms is a vital task not just to resolve the violence but also to create a leveling field for achieving development success that by turn mitigate identity based disputes across the country.

5.3.3 The Ethnic Federalism System and Its Influence on the Afar- Issa Conflict

Now a day, as a result of practicing ethnic federalism system, conflict occurs over administrative boundaries among regional state in the country. In particular case of the Afar and Issa/Somali in Amibara is, the conflict also arose from other factors such as the growing proliferation of local elite's need to border expansion interests and accessibility of illicit trade routes through the porous border along Addis Ababa to Djibouti. The ethnic federalism system was claimed as a remedy for the existed historical distortion among different ethnic groups in terms of political, economic and social inequality. Hence, it's presumed as the best solution to long lasting ethnic discontents among ethnicities as well as against the center.

This section examines conflict between the Afar and their neighbors in Federal Republic of Ethiopia in order to examine how the Afar-Issa conflict had been aggravating due to the eruption of conflicts against their other neighbors. In addition, it could also had a chain impact in which the Afar-Issa conflict may also influence both pastoral groups to search for resource which by turn led them to another round of conflict with various neighbors. Moreover, it is vital to examine similarities as well as differences the Afar and Issa conflict had in relation to conflicts they are engaging with other neighbors.

5.4 Extent and Magnitude of conflict

It is difficult to measure /determine the magnitude and extent of conflict since it is complex by nature and not have recorded data during occurrence of conflict. Since at the occurrence of conflict and its vulnerability might be shocks like human death outbreaks, livestock death outbreaks, human and animal disease outbreaks, or might be sudden loss of resources those are sudden onsets and unpredictable events. However, it is more difficult to explain and describe the extent or magnitude of conflict quantitatively.

For More reliable data are needed to quantify the effects of conflict over resource between the pastoralist communities and its consequence on their livelihood. Indirect effects of conflict on mortality can be formally defined as the number of deaths following a war minus the number of deaths that would have occurred in the same period if the conflict Sims like war had not occurred. For most conflicts, these indirect effects will be positive, indicating an increased mortality for several years after the start of conflict. In some cases, however, these indirect effects can be negative.

According to Afar and Issa respondents, the extent and magnitude of conflict might be measured by counting the died people in the side of Afar during pass away. Similarly in the Issa side counting the weapon and reciprocally is true to determine the magnitude of effects of conflict on resource. Additionally it might be measured by counting the overall damage of the livelihood of pastoral people which depends on both access to assets such as pasture, animal, water health service , markets, environment, etc.

5.5 Consequences on Resource & Livelihood

Pastoralists commonly define wealth in terms of livestock holdings and elements of social capital, such as access to family members for loans, gifts, or other types of support. In any given pastoralist area, there are households which own relatively large numbers of livestock, measured in absolute terms in hundreds or even thousands of animals.

For pastoralist communities around the study area Afar regional state, the main financial asset is livestock. Livestock holdings represent wealth and animals are used both as a form of savings and as assets to be exchanged for cash or grain as needed. The emphasis on livestock ownership and production in pastoralist areas is largely determined by environmental factors and especially the arid or semi-arid conditions with marked variability in rainfall and also they might lead to forced migration. The Afar-Issa Pastoralists face competition from farmers and agro pastoralists, have their lands allocated to commercial rice, sugar, or cotton schemes, are displaced by large-scale dams or other development projects, excluded from wildlife conservation areas, and, in some areas, are affected by bush encroachment that prevents grazing of livestock. These pressures on grazing land increase tensions and conflicts between groups, which in turn can limit access to communal grazing areas.

In general, the findings from this study shows that; the major consequences happened during the conflict was death of human and livestock ,depletion of financial asset, destruction of infrastructures and degradation of natural resource. (Table;2). In addition, pastoralists keep mixed herds of livestock comprising combinations of large and small ruminants. The composition of herds in different areas is influenced by environment and particularly the drought tolerance of different livestock species. Market demands also influence the types of livestock reared, especially by wealthier households.

Table 3: **Type of consequence were happened in the livelihoodof the community**

	Number of respondents	Percent
Human & Livestock death	65	50.39
Depletion of Financial asset	23	17.83
Destruction of Infrastructures	18	13.95
Degradation of natural resource	13	10.08
Forced Migration	10	7.75

Source: Survey 2016

Most of the respondents (50.39%) confirmed that human and livestock deaths are the major consequences of conflict followed by depletion of financial asset (17.83%). Others consequences like destruction of infrastructure, degradation of natural resources and forced migrations took the next stages as the consequence of conflict. As the study area; is characterized by many of the same development issues affecting like other pastoralist areas of Ethiopia. A very longstanding and core problem has been conflict, which, in part, related to the limited and variable natural resources in pastoralist areas and competition for resources between groups. However, conflict also has many other dimensions in these areas due to factors such as limited government capacities in more remote areas, and the frequent “cross-border” aspects of conflict. The consequence on resource and livelihood in pastoralist community of Afar-Issa conflict described as the impact of conflict on livelihoods assets like Human and livestock, financial, physical, natural, social and political assets.

5.5.1 Impacts of conflict on livelihood

Human resource (assets) represent the skills, knowledge, ability to labour, and good health that together enable people to pursue different livelihood strategies and achieve their livelihood objectives. The social resources—networks, membership of groups, relationships of trust, access to wider institutions of society—upon which people draw in pursuit of livelihoods; the exchanges that facilitate cooperation, reduce transaction costs, and may provide the basis for informal safety nets amongst the poor.

The basic infrastructure and producer of goods needed to support livelihoods, including changes to the physical environment that help people to meet their basic needs and to be more productive, and the tools and equipment that people use to function more productively.

An important characteristic of pastoralist human systems is the direct, household-level consumption of livestock products and especially milk. Animal milk is a valuable food containing high-quality protein plus fat, vitamins, and minerals. Therefore the ability of livestock to convert dry land vegetation into milk is one of the fundamental economic justifications for pastoralist human. From our household survey shows that the major resource which was mainly affected are human resource, livestock resource, source of income or assets

Table 4 The type of resource is more affected by the conflict

	Number of respondents	Percent
Human resource(human asset)	78	60.47
Livestock resource	18	13.95
Social resource/asset	18	13.95
Physical asset	15	11.63

Source: Survey 2016

The collected information indicated that the most highly affected resource of the Woreda because of conflict is the human one. Most respondents (60.47%) confirmed this fact. All the other resources affected by the conflict can affect the human side of the Woreda indirectly. Livelihood is the set of capability, assets and activities that furnish the means for people to meet their basic needs and support their wellbeing. Livelihood are not simple phenomena for local

people rather it is connected with the environment, economic, political and cultural processes to wider regional national and global area (FAO, 2007 cited in Mullatu, 2010).

Different populations live by very different means depending on their ecological environment, their assets, culture, skills etc. Some may depend primarily on livestock or fishing, others on agricultural production. Because of rainfall, soil type or marketing possibilities, some areas will be suitable for cash crops (such as cotton and sugarcane) and others will produce only cereal staples.

Human and livestock: The main victims of civil and international conflicts are civilians, not armed combatants physical injury, mental trauma, death, localized livestock raiding possibly resulting in violent injury to livestock keepers and their families. Women and children are particularly badly affected by many forms of conflict—rape, mutilation, and forced marriage of women and girls are tactics of war and counter-revolution; spread of HIV. Destruction of health facilities and disruption of basic preventive health campaigns e.g., child vaccination, destruction of education facilities or disrupted access to education, destruction/damage to water supplies; water-borne disease outbreaks and Injury and death after conflict due to landmines and unexploded arms and may have migrate from the residential place.

Financial: Direct and violent depletion of financial assets such as livestock was a tactic of war and counter-revolution ,Restrictions on movement seasonal labor migration and remittances, market closure or dysfunction, preventing sale or exchange of livestock for cash or grain, breakdown of veterinary services, no preventive or curative services, shocks due to disease epidemics and loss of assets, Limited private sector investment, high risks of doing business and trade with trade controlled by armed elites for personal gain and related incentives for maintaining conflict.

Physical: Destruction or damage to roads and physical infrastructure, destruction or contamination of water sources as a method or war and counter revolution.

Natural: Restricted movement limits access to grazing areas; overgrazing of accessible areas; restricted cross-border movements “Bad diversification” e.g., excessive charcoal production and may occurred forest fire, “No man’s land” areas between conflicting groups, Landmines and unexploded arms preventing access to grazing areas, fail of traditional institutions for natural resource management.

Social: Forced migration; breakup of families and communities, breakdown of traditional safety nets or social support, breakdown of traditional leadership and institutions, new and violent “social norms”

Political: Reduced political capital as pastoralists are portrayed as inherently violent or supporting insurgents, opposition groups, or religious extremists. Table 5 how to measure conflict consequence magnitude and extent over resource and livelihood?

Conflict can occur suddenly, without warning, and can be large-scale; it can also be considered a shock. Such events cause direct loss of human life and injury, destruction of property and physical infrastructure, loss or theft of assets, and disruptions to basic services such as health and education.

Table 5: Measuring conflict consequence magnitude and extent over resource and livelihood

	Number of respondents	Percent
By counting the number of human death	74	57.36
By counting the number of livestock death	41	31.78
By counting the number of none -human weapons	14	10.85

Source: Survey 2016

Most of the respondents believed that extent of conflict are measured by the number of people lives sacrificed in the conflict, number of livestock death and counting the number of non-human weapons captured in the conflict. The result obtained in the survey confirmed this fact. 57.36 % of respondents believed that magnitude of conflict is measured by counting the number of human deaths, 31.78 % by counting the number of livestock deaths and the remaining by counting the number of non-human weapons captured during the conflict time. The number indicated that the concern of the people residing in such areas. Some of the people want to win the conflict with more human scarification, while others have special concern to sacrifice their animals than human. Even others measure it through the counting of the number of weapons captured since they grew with the culture of masculine. In this society, there is a culture that defeating others by capturing their weapons will make them proud of their tribes and have a superior position in the

eye of the society. That's they measured the magnitude of conflict by counting non-human weapons captured.

5.6 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Government Intervention in the Pastoralist Community of Afar- Issa Conflict

5.6.1 Interventions by Successive Governments of Ethiopia

Since the introduction of a new administrative structure in post-war Ethiopia (after the Italian occupation), various negotiations, high level meetings, peace deals as well as corrective measures have been conducted and implemented regarding the age-old conflict between the Afar and Issa/Somali. Though all these complex processes are present day phenomenon, yet the conflict continues to intensify, the number and severity of casualties enhancing day in and day out. As a matter of fact, preventing conflicts before it erupts as well as mitigating the ongoing confrontations were major tasks for a government who claim to exercise good democratic governance like that of the current government of Ethiopia.

However, most of governments sponsored peace deals as argued by Ayalew (2001:181) was “nominal and short-lived at best.” Giving less attention to the root causes of conflicts as well as focusing solely on short-lived political interest further turns to be part of the quandary rather than a solution for ethnic conflicts. Likewise, successive government interventions in to the age-old Afar and Issa/Somali conflicts seem to fall woefully short. Apart from all, the current government that claim to have better understanding on the country's ethnic factors are yet stuck on a fire brigade work in which they run to put out the fire here and there. Tadesse and Yonas(2007: 6) showed a very dim light on the probability of success story regarding the current government's resolution attempt by stating that “the Afar-Issa conflict in Ethiopia is causing much damage to both communities. The conflict between the two communities was left by previous regimes to pursue its own dynamic course and, sadly, the present government has done no better.”

5.6.1.1 Resolution Attempts during the Emperor's Era

Various attempts were made to settle frequent eruption of armed conflict and livestock looting among the Afar and Issa/Somali ethnic groups that seriously affected the peace and stability of

the Imperial government administrative units in which the two pastoral groups inhabited. Peace negotiations organized in the level of local administration up to the central government in Addis Ababa were held but to no avail. Actions that range from trying to cajole the heart of the outlaws' up to undertaking punitive measure were tried. Beside the carrot and stick measures, administrative units were made to shift thrice but still unsuccessful in bringing lasting peace and stability. A thorough analysis of resolution efforts undertaken by successive governments in Ethiopia and Djibouti and examining the success as well as failure history of coercive, non-coercive and mixed incentive strategies being implemented could facilitate to identify key factors in order to resolve or at least mitigate grievances between the two ethnic groups.

5.6.1.2 The Derg and Its Conflict Settlement Perspective

The Derg regime, which entirely tied up with internal political turmoil as well as armed struggles that stretched from the north to the eastern border, could not deal much on the Afar and Issa/Somali conflict. The government had a blanket perception of the past, 'nothing good out of the feudal regime.' Thus it took the Derg long to review archives and view broadly the nexus between local conflicts and dynamics in regional political orders. In late 1980s, the vanguard party - the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) - established a nationalities reconciliation committee that included members from both Afar and Issa/Somali. However, the attempt remained far for solution alike its predecessor's. As Klein (2002:23) argued "[According to] Marxist influenced liberation theory, conflict was reduced to contradictions between classes, which could only be resolved through the elimination of class differences."

Therefore, for the Socialist Derg, the conflict between the egalitarian pastoralists of Afar and Issa/Somali people is yet class struggle which is manipulated by remnants of the feudal system. Thus, the age-old raids and counter raids among both societies are considered as banditry, which instigated by the anti-revolutionary forces. Post the second Ethio-Somali war (1977-78), the abstract picture of the conception of 'Greater Somalia' packed inside the Afar-Issa/Somali conflict seemed to be viewed within the scope of the Derg. As a result, the Derg took the action of lining a boundary between the two ethnic groups that indeed has paused the fluid border between the Afar and Issa/Somali for some years.

5.6.1.3 The EPRDF's Approach for the Resolution of Afar-Issa/Somali Conflict

After the EPRDF took power in May 1991, took one giant leap, which enabled them to step their foot on the main asphalt road. Issa/Somalis even caught the Afars off guard with their speed to breach the 'buffer zone' and knock on the Afar's doorsteps.

Unlike the previous study, currently due to the government intervention the effect and magnitude of Afar-Issa conflict is reduced especially the last 8 months. There were no people died, absence of robbery of resource, and also sharing resource between Afar and Issa without any problem .

The current government of Ethiopia (EPRDF) exerted a great effort to overcome the problem that is related to Afar-Issa conflict and answer for those identified causes and sources of conflict such as through a process of clearly define the Afar-Issa administrative division, training to awareness creation, expanding basic infrastructures like access to water, access to health post, access to school, access to road and also exercising good governance through the governmental structure of Federal level, regional level, zonal level, woreda level, kebele and ketene/got level.

As described in Herrie (2008:26) "the current conflict between Afar and the Issa- Somalis persists in a more violent and politicized way in the new federal era." Identifying geographical borders for the two regional states is the unfinished action but yet 'on course' for almost two decades rule of the EPRDF regime. Since the end of honeymoon between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998, the two regions were tied up in marathon joint peace negotiations initiated by the federal government. Peace negotiations that have been conducted either at Addis Abeba, Awash; Adaytu, Gewane or Dire Dawa faced a dead end with bringing no value since its inception on the morrow of Eritrean intrusion to Badme. Apart from deploying federal army along the main road (particularly from Awash to Mille), EPRDF led federal government of Ethiopia still claim searching a lasting resolution for the Afar-Issa conflict.

5.6.1.3.1 Peace Negotiations

The Imperial government has also undertaken successive peace negotiations between the Afar and Issa/Somali conflict. A number of negotiations were conducted since late 1940s, after reinstating the Imperial government in the post-Italian occupation of Ethiopia, up until early 1970s, during the eve of the emperor's regime came to an end. However, almost all negotiation attempts could not possibly bring fruit as peace deals were regularly violated. Moreover, lack of

clan leaders wholeheartedly endeavor to play their role as a bridge for peace was also a major obstacle in the peace negotiations. For the clan leaders, even to ask the people to handover criminals, would automatically lead them to lose the trust from their respective people. Now aday it also taken as a method of resolving conflict management. And Hence, the negotiation went on and off with no significant influence on the resolution of the conflict. The administration of Harar Governorate General used to request the leaders of each groups about their opinion to bring the conflict to an end. The Issa/Somali chiefs claimed that they refrain to stop the people from intrusion to neighboring territories. The Ugaas himself declared to government officials that ‘no Issa accepted his request to handover criminals and return looted livestock and hence he has nothing to do except waiting the government decision.’ Afar clan chiefs on their part appealed to the government ‘to enforce a mechanism in which both ethnic groups could identify and respect each other’s boundary.’

5.6.1.3.2 Strengthen The Joint Peace Committees:

The federal government initiated and organized a joint peace committee (JPC) that include government officials in the federal, regional, zonal and Wereda level in both Afar and Somali regional states

According to the Afar and Somali regions joint peace committee task implementation report the two conflicting parties were requested ‘to delay their quest for boundary demarcation until Shabiya’s defeat is realized and urged to keep peace and stability that could sustain at least until the government achieved its main goal. The JPC was supposed to be exemplary for resolving similar conflicts among ethnic groups within the Federal Republic of Ethiopia Thus, the two regions joint committee set up a kebele administrations, security and police force, and even established court in all the three towns in March 1998. There were a first instance court established at Gedmaytu and Unduffo and a higher court established at Adaytu. According to Informants, for any criminal act conducted between an Afar and Somali anywhere in the two regions, it became mandatory to bring the case to the courts in one of the three towns. Here the act of Bitew-led JPC seriously clashed with the constitution of the country. Firstly, there is no legal ground for two regions to establish joint courts. Secondly, according to Sub-Article 4 of Article 78 of the constitution that declare about the ‘Independence of the Judiciary’, taking all criminal acts carried out in any location within the territory of the two regional states to the joint

courts established in the three towns, definitely took away the judiciary power of other courts that exist in a place where the criminal act has taken place. Sub-Article 4 of Article 78 reads as follows:

Special or ad hoc courts which take judicial powers away from the regular courts or institutions legally empowered to exercise judicial functions and which do not follow legally prescribed procedures shall not be established.

On March 2003, the courts were dissolved according to the decision of the federal government. As a result, the two regions had shared the property and closed a joint bank account that the committee had in Mille and Awash 7 Killo towns.

Article 32 of the constitution stated freedom of movement as follows:

Any Ethiopian or foreign national lawfully in Ethiopia has, within the national territory, the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence, as well as the freedom to leave the country at any time he wishes to.

On the other side, Afars argued that they lost these areas due to massive illegal successive attacks by the Issa/Somalis. Therefore; according to them, prior to rushing to raise the issue of ‘rights’ of movement; one should also respect the ‘rights of life and security’ for others. Consequently, the administrative divisions of these hamlets become still vague. The Somali regional states include them in Meiso and AfdemWeredas while the Afar region administrative structure include them within zone 1 and zone 3. In fact, reconciling claim of the Afars which is based on historical rights and that of the Somali’s claim based in constitutional rights seems a bit complex that need a careful political decision. The delay of the final decision in turn worsens the intensification of the conflict. Actors who are directly involved in the conflict extends from youths of the two societies to clan and religious leaders and high level federal and regional government officials. Therefore, for solving thus complex issue of conflict it should be strengthen The Joint Peace Committee.

5.7 Role of Regional and International Organizations to Facilitate Peaceful Settlement of the Afar-Issa Conflict

Conflicts between the straddled ethnic groups have usually a spread over effect in which regional states may involve in one way or another. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Afar and Issa/Somali conflict has invited a number of regional actors including colonial powers,

independent states, insurgent groups, contrabandists, and even ‘terrorism’ factor. Since recently all positive interventions conducted to diffuse the Afar- Issa/Somali rivalry focused on a very local perspective that totally neglect the regional dimension of the conflict. Indeed, in Ethiopia apart from very few studies conducted with the collaboration of international organizations like Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, GTZ organized forum held in 2005 and a study conducted by MoFA in collaboration with the GTZ, there has been no record of involvement by any other international organizations. Recently, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and its Conflict Early Warning Unit (CEWARN) expanded their activities and has opened Dikhil Cluster in Djibouti. Indeed, USAID beef up CEWARN financial resource in order to support projects in conflict prevention and response among pastoral communities in the Horn of Africa

5.7.1 Indigenous Conflict Management Institutions

The indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms among the Afar and Issa do no longer exist. Elders from both communities confirmed that in the old days whenever conflict erupts between them, no police or court was expected to be involved. Rather women from either side would be sent as a messenger to offer peace dialogue. During focus group discussions (FGD) as mentioned by some pastoralists “women who were considered to be no cause for danger on account of the cultural beliefs associated with femininity. Females were believed to inflict no harm and were not, therefore, regarded as targets of retaliatory attacks.” Apart from the role women were played in the initial offer to dialogue; clans had also a vital role in the conflict settlement process. For instance in a conflict that erupts between the Debine and Harala clans of Afar and Somali, a neutral clan in that specific incident like Weima-Afar or Harala-Somali could play a role as envoy for peace negotiations. However, as the root causes, triggering factors as well as actors of the conflict altered gradually, the relevance of traditional system became of no value. The situation in which even kids and pregnant mothers are becoming target of armed conflicts could clearly show how the traditional values are being eroded. Peace agreements are becoming usual to be broken shortly after participants disperse from meeting halls. Hence it is very crucial to analyze the reasons behind the failure history of resolution efforts towards the Afar and Issa conflict in Ethiopia. Thus, this part discusses the involvement of successive governments as well as other stakeholders in the long lasting conflict among the Afar and Issa of Ethiopia.

Conflicts between Afar clans are managed by the *madaa* based on Afar customary law. Members of the traditional jury are elders selected from different clans, excluding the clans involved in

dispute. The process is called *billiarri*, which literally means peace-making. In the mediation process, the mediators focus on cooling off the parties by extending the length of the procedure until they settle their affairs by themselves. According to the elders in Ambash, traditional deliberations may take up to two weeks. Sanctions are not designed to punish the wrongdoer. Instead, to use Rugege's expressions, the traditional mediators impose sanctions based more on the "give-little-and-take-little" principle than the "winner-takes-all" principle (1995). The *madaa* has the authority and legitimacy to effectively enforce sanctions imposed by the traditional jury. Central to its effectiveness is the tradition of forgiveness among Afar clans, respect for elders, and the transfer of resources as compensation. As a result, there are few cases in which conflicts between Afar clans escalate until they need the mediation of outsiders.

The *madaa* was able to effectively manage conflicts between Afars and some of their neighbors in the past (Getachew 2001). For example, Afar and Karrayyu used to share institutions that enable them to exchange fugitives, pay compensation, and reduce tensions; i.e. if an Afar murdered a Karrayyu (or vice versa), a traditional jury composed of both ethnic groups would handle the case. However, though they still exist to some extent, these shared institutions are no longer influential. For Afar and Issa, the traditional framework for managing conflicts (as well as enforcing agreements) is either latent or non-existent. In general, the *madaa* is now less effective at managing inter-ethnic conflicts

The Indigenous System In any conflict, an Afar has two main options for settlement: resort to the modern system of state courts or recourse to the indigenous Afar institutions of conflict management. Most Afar, however, seem to go for the latter option. Though resort to court to settle a dispute is, in principle, open to the Afar, most cases of intra-Afar conflicts are resolved outside courts. The Afar generally tend to channel disputes to local mediation where conflicts are addressed in a less rigid manner, compared to the modern court where adjudication is based on largely standardized and uncontested rules. There is an indigenous Afar institution promoting local mediation in conflict resolution. Central to the indigenous mechanism of conflict management are the tradition of forgiveness, respect for elders (because of their symbolic authority to enforce decisions) and the transfer of resources as compensation payments. Resolutions by local mediators may take the form of negotiation or arbitration and are generally reached with reference to Afar norms and values. In theory, proceedings of mediation may be

subject to manipulation by the different parties, including the arbitrators. In practice, however, such manipulations seem severely constrained by the elaborate and meticulous provisions of Afar customary law (Ma'ada) particularly in an inter-clan context. As soon as guilt is proven, the customary law provides guidelines for the amount of compensation or fine to be paid. It is conspicuous in inter-clan conflicts that once the proceedings for dispute settlement by the indigenous system commence, possibilities for referring the case to the state court become minimal.

In general, the state itself does not seem eager to be involved in intra-Afar disputes. The only instances of state intervention thus are confined to situations of escalated inter-clan Conflicts involving reprisal killing and counter-raiding of herds. Even in such intervention, the state seems to target restoration of relative peace in order to enable Afar clan leaders to resolve the conflict through customary law. Thus the state apparatus may find it imperative to intervene only when an Afar disagrees to the decision reached by the indigenous court. Such cases of disagreement are rather uncommon, and even when appeals to the modern court are made court officials often tend to encourage recourse to the indigenous system.. Several factors contribute to that resilience: internal and external factors. The most important internal factor is that the indigenous institutions acquire their status of authority and power from Afar normative frameworks. The indigenous institutions do not seek mere restitution and lifting of injustice. They simultaneously strive to avert ruptures in social relations and to create conditions conducive to peace in the post-conflict future. Another internal factor is that the persons intervening to resolve disputes (clan leaders, elders and local mediators) are generally well known to, and respected by, the conflicting parties. The disputants thus know both the procedures and the personnel beforehand. In other words, the system seems quite transparent at the grassroots and offers a reasonable degree of local participation. These features contribute to the consolidation of confidence and trust in its resolutions and, by implication, to its persistence. Last but not least, social sanctions by the wider society on individuals rejecting resort to the indigenous system, or disagreeing to its resolutions, also play a role in the apparent resilience and persistence of the system. The external factors contributing to the persistence of Afar institutions of conflict management may be analyzed at two levels: the general attitude of the Woreda Court officials (implying a de facto state policy) towards intra-Afar conflicts and certain features of state institutions, particularly of the judiciary.

a) ***The Afar Customary Law (Mad'aa)***: Afar elders strongly emphasize that all Afar are governed by the same custom (Ada) irrespective of their clan membership, area of residence or changes in national politics. This, of course, may be a reflection of the new Afar ethnic identity formation, or is probably meant to indicate that differences in clan identity and residential features within the Afar are no longer important. Indeed, the new federal system of administration in Ethiopia has given ethnicity a new impetus as a result of which the Afar now see themselves as a national group. The Afar believe that all disputes within their ethnic group should be settled peacefully and according to the long standing customary laws (Mad'aa) It consists of specified guidelines and rules on how to handle dispute cases. This is a tradition pursued from the time of their epical ancestors. Once a dispute case is in the hands of elders, there can be very little room for an individual to further his interests by force. This seems to be the norm no matter how long it takes the elders to process the dispute and reach a settlement. In hearing a dispute case, it is imperative that the judges be treated with humbleness and utmost respect. Failure to execute patience and tolerance will lead to an immediate fine. It is required that proceedings take place in good order with persons talking only when asked to.

An entire clan or sub-clan is said to be responsible for a crime committed by one or some of its members. The money and livestock to be paid in compensation must in principle come from contributions by clan members regardless of their place of residence. According to Afar customary law, the amount of compensation depends on the type of offence and the context in which it occurred.

b) ***The Judicial Procedure***: As indicated above indigenous ways of resolving conflicts are guided by specific rules and procedures. In an inter-clan context, the procedures to follow are well established. An example of how inter-clan disputes are settled at the community level is given below: In cases of inter-clan homicide, the judges (Mekabon) summon the leaders of the concerned clans as soon as the identities of both the murderer and the deceased are identified. The judges (Mekabon) are often drawn from clans other than those involved in the conflict. Traditionally, the Mekabons are composed of leaders of the Damohita and Seka Clans. As the meeting is convened, a cow or camel is sacrificed. This is said to be an important step and a precondition for the commencement of the actual dispute settlement

procedures. The Afar claim that the victim would not be buried before sacrificing an animal (Waidal). Once sacrifice and burial are carried out in that order, further investigation proceeds. The final verdict depends on the nature of the murder, i.e. how the incident took place, the type of weapon used, and whether or not it was intentional.

A period of forty days (Morotem) is given to finalize investigation of the murder case. In the mean time, clan and family members of the deceased remain under oath that they will not attempt to retaliate. After the Morotem period is over, people gather for the final judgment, which always takes place according to preexisting rules. The family of the victim is asked whether it seeks capital punishment to be meted on the murderer. The response is usually negative so that the community would not be divided in blood feud. There is always a tendency for institutional forgiveness. Once the offender is excused, a specified time is fixed for the transfer of compensation or blood money, which is contributed by affluent clan members. Camels are given to the family and clan members of the deceased. It is important that all livestock be in good condition. Disagreement over the condition of animals is believed to lead to further complication of the conflict as offering unhealthy animals is considered a gesture of contempt. The clan leader of the deceased receives one camel (Loinalah). The final procedure in the achievement of reconciliation involves slaughtering a sheep in the presence of the judges who, as stated earlier, are composed of elders from the Damohita and Seka clans. The latter recite verses from the Quaran to signify the conclusion of reconciliation. The Seka elders also give their blessings (Doa). This final sacrifice (Sola) usually takes place along trodden roads so that passers-by may draw lessons in forgiveness and thereby contribute to the persistence of the tradition. The animal is roasted on fire lit on a collection of black stones, which are not supposed to be removed from the area for years after the ritual. Virtually all cases of inter-clan homicide end up in reconciliation. In some cases, relatives of victim may decline to offer forgiveness at the inception of procedures, refuse mediation and threaten to take revenge. Upon such intransigence, some members of the murderer's clan may assemble to exercise further begging (Dubarti). The clan leader would then normally seek to exert pressure to influence the person(s) threatening to take revenge.

In rare instances, some murder cases may obstinately lead to reprisal killings and close agnates of the murderer may come under attack. The potential victims of retaliation may extend up to the

7 generations in the genealogical order. In principle, only a few members of the patrilineage should be affected but, in practice, the clan leader or any other person with high respect and prestige in the clan may also be targeted.

5.7.2 Formal Conflict Management Institutions

- a) **The Police Force:** The police force is part of the formal modern state institutions even though it acts locally. It can be labeled as an intermediary agent whose prime task is to channel dispute cases to appropriate higher agency in the formal legal structure. During violent conflicts particularly in an inter-clan fierce encounters armed units bring situations under control by tracking down culprits and putting them in custody temporarily. Then, subsequent negotiations take place between state administrative bodies and clan elders making it easier for the latter to intervene and reach a final settlement.
- b) **The Sharia Courts:** The Sharia court is a system that is run by local persons but is nevertheless part and parcel of the formal legal machinery. The tentacles of Sharia courts may extend up to the kebele (settlement) level. Marital disputes that could not be resolved by informal moots are often referred to the Sharia courts where the disputants face a statement of verdict given by the religious judges (Qadi). This structure has some links to the government court at the woreda level. Its decisions are approved and implemented by the other formal legal and administrative bodies at the higher level. But the sharia court works independently of the modern court and does not look into cases being handled by the latter.
- c) **The Modern Court:** This is a formal state judiciary system that may be viewed as external to the community with regard to both its principles and procedures, viz., the modern court established at woreda level. This court handles both civil and criminal cases. The parties to a court case are typically unrelated through kinship or marriage, though in recent years disputes among kinsmen are rising. Except in cases of grave physical injury, local disputants who bring their cases to the modern court are advised to settle their differences through informal means. This is particularly true in cases where the disputants are related by kinship and marriage. As explained earlier, members of a settlement in the study areas are often related through either descent or affinity. In effect the modern court encourages related disputants to resolve their case outside the formal state system. At the inter-clan level, there seems to be very weak links between the modern woreda court and the indigenous council of conflict resolution. Generally,

the council makes no appeal to the court. Rarely, individual disputants may, on their own accord, take their cases to the court. However, they are usually told by the court officials (almost to the point of forcing them) to go to their respective clan heads in order to allow intervention by the indigenous council. It has now become an established fact among the Afar that this is the only solution as far as inter-clan disputes are concerned. Past experience shows that the modern court is not effective in handling such disputes; and resolutions made at this level have generally failed to bring long lasting peace to the community. In this connection Cossins (1972:32) has reported that, in general, government involvement in inter-clan conflicts was confined to returning raided animals from other groups and bringing murderers to justice when the victims are non-Afar. Beyond such government involvement, the Afar were quite free to settle their internal affairs without much government intervention. Only in incidents inducing chaos and feud would the government administrative and military organs intervene to prevent further escalation of conflict and avoid destruction to property and human lives. Once relative peace is restored, however, the government police and military units hand over the case to the council and prepare the necessary ground for settlement of the dispute according to customary law.

The existence of well-functioning formal institutions (in addition to informal ones) may have two related benefits for societies (Knight 1992). First, the existence of formal institutions facilitates the introduction of third-party enforcers (mainly the state) and can help to stabilize informal institutions. Second, the introduction of formal institutions makes the institutional setup more complete and robust for handling diverse challenges and opportunities. In this respect, state-backed property rights and conflict management institutions can augment informal institutions in managing conflicts in pastoral areas (Swallow and Bromley 1995).

As a third-party rule enforcer, the state is expected to facilitate peaceful interaction between right-holders and duty-bearers. However, this is not the case in the study areas: the right-holders and the duty-bearers are often unknown, particularly in border areas. Meanwhile, high territorial demand is observed particularly for locations that have either better pastoral resources (such as the Alaydeghi plain) or strategic importance for exploiting trade opportunities (such as Gedamaitu and Adaitu). Afars move into contested areas without the consent of their neighbors because they believe that these areas are within their territorial domain. Their neighbors also do not hesitate to take countervailing actions that usually lead to bloody confrontations. The actions

of the local administrations are limited to precautionary tactics such as establishing offices in contested areas to safeguard future claims of their people. At higher levels, conflicts are understated and are usually considered as temporary conflicts over pasture and water rather than a struggle between groups for permanent territorial control.

In several policy documents the Ethiopian government has acknowledged the complexity of pastoral challenges and called for certain critical interventions to improve the livelihoods of pastoral communities. However, conflict and its management have received marginal attention, if mentioned at all, in many of the contemporary policy documents. For instance, while eight articles (out of 104) in the food security strategy of 1996 discuss pastoral areas, none of them mentions the importance of conflict management in these areas (FDRE 1996). Even the most recent policy document, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program, envisages no systematic way of managing conflicts in pastoral areas (FDRE 2002).

The mediation forums were held in urban centers in the presence of traditional leaders and government officials, where the latter took leadership on the stage. The meetings lasted two to three days depending upon the complexity of the cases and the damages involved.

CHAPTER SIX : CONCLUSION AND RECOMENDATION

The major question addressed in this study was what are the major factors associated with Afar-Issa conflict? To what extent does the conflict affect the resource and livelihood of the pastoralist community? Which type of livelihood is more affected by the conflict? How much it is effective the action taken by the government to solve the problem?

Since the major findings of the study were clearly place in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the conclusions and recommendation part.

6.1 Conclusion

Based on the findings and the summaries of the research, the following conclusions can be drawn. Since the Imperial era, successive governments have attempted to resolve the conflict between the Afar and Issa/Somali but to no avail. Unlike any other inter ethnic and/or pastoral conflicts; heads of governments of the three regimes (Haile Selassie, Mengistu Hailemariam, Melse Zenawi and Hailemariam Desalgne) have directly been involved in this age-old conflict between Afar and Issa/Somali. In addition, peace negotiations and dialogues were undertaken during the emperor era held at different towns from Harar to Addis Ababa. Coercive measures were also employed to calm down destabilized scenario and in order to pressurize groups to come down at the discussion table. However the dialogue and negotiation attempts in all the three regimes brought no significant hope in mitigating the conflict let alone offering lasting solution. Among all, the 1983 Dergue's decision for the implementation of a buffer zone, temporary halted continues Issa/Somalis expansion. The current ethno-linguistic federal structure further escalated the conflict and new actors that range from ethnic based political parties, insurgent groups to regional state governments are added. The root and accelerated cause like economic cause, socio-economic culture, politico-economic, ecological and ethnic federalism as well as the pasture and water points are the main in pastoralist community.

The main victims of civil and international conflicts are civilians, not armed combatants physical injury, mental trauma, death, localized livestock raiding possibly resulting in violent injury to livestock keepers and their families. Moreover, according to the data analyzed, the federal

government appears to emphasize on the security of the road rather than offering long lasting solution or at least mitigating the alarming rivalry of the two societies and intensification of the conflict both in frequency and magnitude.

6. 2 Recommendations

Based on the conclusions and findings of the study, the following recommendations are made. The key actors involved in this conflict could have gained some understanding on conflict resource between the pastoralist communities in relation with its consequence on their livelihood for the case of Afar- Issa conflict in Amibara woreda Afar regional And hence these understandings together with some policy recommendations offered in this sub-topic would well-equip the main actors to play their positive role. The major actors, governments of Ethiopia should develop regional peace and security policy frameworks that could mitigate the conflict. And eventually devise ways and means for transforming conflict into sustainable cooperation among the Afar and Issa ethnic groups there could be a bridge to peace, stability and unity. Therefore, from the evidence we see that this conflict has several facets and needs a comprehensive peace strategy and concrete strategies to break the conflict trap.

The conflict resolution mechanism should be adjusted to deal with this problem. This would aim to strengthen the system of government in the pastoralist areas by incorporating into it traditional elements that are still functioning. The clan is still the cornerstone of pastoralist societies, yet the political system ignores it, reserve for the appointment of a few elders and chiefs as advisers to elected councils social and political life in the pastoralist world is ruled by kinship. Only in the political sphere is this principle not recognized. This disjunction is a handicap in governance. And also Positive intervention is therefore required from different levels of governments of host states, elites of both communities in political as well as religious leader organizations in order to address the long lasting conflict in a just and sustainable way.

- a) The government shall examine and differentiate traditional pastoral disputes with the current wounded confrontations involving a number of non-pastoral actors in the region.
- b) The federal government should demarcate the physical border between the Afar and Somali regional states. Moreover, as both communities are predominantly pastoralists, a buffer zone is also important in order to mitigate the risk of pastoral confrontation that might erupt over grazing areas or water points.

- c) The federal government should strictly bring criminals to court. For those outlaws who stealing resource like livestock from both Afar and Issa community, traverse the border mainly towards the horn country, agreement should be reached with the government of horn countries that would create an obligation to hand-over suspected criminals.
- d) The federal government shall take appropriate diplomatic measures against External and internal military personnel's intervention in the so-called pastoral conflicts within Ethiopian territories.
- e) The federal government shall initiate and design pastoral development projects and basic infrastructures ensuring sufficient consultation with local communities. Instead, the federal government shall support regions to design land tenure policy that could address economic causes for the escalation of inter/intra-ethnic disputes.
- f) The federal government shall bring to scalps the best practice from other regional states administrative way of exercising and should create relationship between Afar and Issa community like relation through marriage, through learn together, through work together, through eat together, through use common market and strengthen the other common value share within Afar and Issa community.
- g) Both regional governments shall rise the status of traditional leadership and have to give due attention to improve the political and social status of women, including their traditional role in conflict resolution.
- h) Both regional governments should focus on development projects along their common borders. Joint development plans should be initiated regarding the enhancement of access to grazing and marketing areas and water resource. Moreover, means for economic diversification and technological developments that could raise productivity levels should be studied and implemented by merging with traditional rangeland management system as well as regular nature conservation system and examining environmental & watershed management related studies .
- i) NGOs and Development agents can participate in the peace-building process by adopting targeted community development projects such as community based natural resource management. Joint projects involving neighboring communities deepen intergroup contact enabling people to develop a common vision and goal.

- j) Efforts must be geared towards developing an integrated approach to conflict management by merging existing customary law with the formal institutions.
- k) Building institutions for good governance, the consolidation of civil society and democratic rule can prevent conflicts from occurring on a large scale.

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Questioner

INTRODUCTION

Hello! My name is ----- I am MA student in university of **IGNOU**. The purpose of this questionnaire is to gather reliable data& information on Impact and Associated Factors of Conflict over Resource and Livelihood in Pastoralist Community: The Case of Afar - Issa Conflict in AmibaraWoreda, Afar Regional State

I have identified you as a study participant hoping that you would be willing to help provide me with some information. I have several questions which I would like to ask you, if you have the time and are willing. The questionnaires include socio demographic factors, Conflict over the resource between the Pastoralist Community and Conflict Consequence on Communities Livelihood. All information you provide will be kept confidential. I will not include any identifiers, such as your name or exact address. Only honest answers would contribute to improvement of Livelihood in Pastoralist Community, Conflict Resolution Mechanisms and Reduction of conflict. Your role in the success of the research is important and I appreciate your contribution to the research. You can with draw at any time during the interview if you feel uncomfortable. Would this be okay with you?

I understood about the advantage of the research and the roles I will have in the research. I have agreed to participate in the research.

Therefore, you are kindly requested to give your answers for all questions that you feel and you are expected to:-

- Circle the letter that contains the correct answer for close ended questions
- Write short and precise answers for open ended questions. And
- Put () mark for questions presented in the table
- 001: Address/ kebele /ketena/ -----
- 002: Date of data collection-----
- 003: Name of data collector----- signature-----
- 004: Name of supervisor----- signature-----

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

3. If your Answer in Question No 2 is also No, list down your Reasons:-

4. Which type of consequences were happened, when the conflict were occurred?

- a) Human & Livestock death
- b) Depletion of Financial asset
- c) Destruction of Infrastructures
- d) Degradation of natural resource
- e) Forced Migration

5. How the conflicts affect the Resource of the Community? Please specify them?

6. How the conflicts affect the Livelihood of the Community? Please specify them?

7. Which type of Resource is more affected by the Conflict and in what case and extent?

- a) Human resource(human asset)
- b) Livestock resource
- c) Social resource/asset
- d) Physical asset

8. Which type of Livelihood statues is more affected by the Conflict and in what case and extent? Please specify them?

9. How to measure Conflict Consequence Magnitude and extent over Resource and Livelihood statuses of Afar- Issa community? Please specify them?

- a) By counting the number of human death
- b) By counting the number of livestock death
- c) By counting the number of none -human weapons
- d) Others, please specify them? -----

10. What type of effect would you expect on the Environment rather than the Consequence of Conflict over Resource and Livelihood of the community? Please specify them?

11. What type of mitigation measures we will apply on the impact over Environment for the feature? Please specify them?

Part IV: - Questions Related to Conflict Resolution Mechanism in Pastoralist community

1. Are their actions taken as possible solutions with regard to Afar-Issa conflict for the previous years that you know?

A/Yes B/ No

2. If your Answer in Question No 1 is Yes, what was, Specify theme:

3. If your answer in Question No 1 is also No, Why? Specify theme:

4. What are the mechanisms that you expect to live in peace condition without Conflict around in Afar-Issa border? Please explain theme?

4.1. Is their Traditional Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in your area? A/ Yes B/ No

4.2. If Yes, What are your traditional conflict management systems in your Community? Please explain theme?

4.3. Do you think it was effective to solve the conflict sustainably? A/ Yes B/ No

5. Is their actions taken by the government to solve the conflict in Afar and Somalia borders? A/ Yes B/ No

6. If your Answer in Question No 6 is yes, what are the actions?

7. Do you think the actions taken by the Government were effective to stop the conflict sustainably? A/ Yes B/ No

8. If your Answer in Question No 6 is also No, please explain your reason:

9. In the Feature, what type of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms will be taken to reduce Conflict crisis around in Afar-Issa? Please explain theme?

10. For the Feature, What are you recommend about Government Intervention to solve Conflict related to Afar-Issa? Please explain theme?

