THE ISSUES OF IMPARTIALTY UNDER UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN COTE D'IVOIRE SPECIAL REFERENCE WITH ABIDIGAN, CASE STUDY

By

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INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY

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DECLARATION

I here by declare that the Dissertation entitled THE ISSUES OF IMPARTIALTY UNDER UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN COTE D'IVOIRE SPECIAL REFERENCE WITH   ABIDIGAN, CASE STUDY submitted by me for the partial fulfillment of the Masters Degree in Art of Political Science (MPS) to Indira Gandhi National Open University, (IGNOU) New Delhi, is my own original work and has not been submitted earlier, either to IGNOU or to any other institution for the fulfillment of the requirement for any other study. I also declare that no chapter of this manuscript in whole or in part is lifted and incorporated in this report from any earlier work done by me or others.

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CERTIFICATION

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATION

UN	United Nation
AU	African Union
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
ONUB	UN Operation in Burundi
UNMEE	UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission
UNMIS	UN Mission in the Sudan
UNISFA	UN Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNMISS	UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan
UNOCI	UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
ONUC	Organization des Nations Unies au Congo, abbreviated ONUC English: The United Nations Organization in the Congo
NGO	Non-Government Organization
MONUC	UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary- General
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
DOMREP	Dominican Republic Mission of the Representative of theSecretary-General in the Dominican Republic
UNSF	UN Security Force in West New Guinea (Wes Irian)
UNYOM	UN Yemen Observation Mission

UNFICYP .... UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

UNEF II .... UN Emergency Force II

UNEF I .... UN Emergency Force I

UNDOF .... UN Disengagement Observer Force

UNIFIL .... UN Interim Force in Lebanon

ECOWAS .... Economic Community of West

                                          African States

MINUCI .... Nations Mission in Côte

                                          d'Ivoire

MRNDD .... National Republican Movement for
Democracy and Development

UNAVEM ……………………………………… UN Angola Verification Mission

ECOMOG…………………………………………. Economic Community of West

                                          AfricanStates Monitoring Group

ABSTRACT

The latest phase of the conflict came to a head after the principal parties disputed the results of the long-postponed presidential election of 28 November 2010. Thereafter armed conflict reignited between the supporters of incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo and his challenger Alassane Ouattara. Within days of Gbagbo claiming an election victory, ECOWAS and UN Secretary General concluded that Ouattara had in fact prevailed, yet Gbagbo and his supporters refused to step aside. As fighters from both sides began to commit atrocities. Consequently, On 30 March the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1975. This recognized Ouattara as president, condemned Gbagbo's refusal to negotiate a resolution, and authorized UNOCI to 'use all necessary means' to protect civilians, Including by 'preventing the use of heavy weapons against the civilian and also to maintain peace and security.

The research conduct on the researchers would us his own memoir and visit post-conflict scar and trauma that were recorded while the conflict was taking place in Côte d'Ivoire; disputes about citizenship and ethnicity resurfaced; both sides used violence and intimidation, and dozens were killed in pre-election violence. Using this Gbagbo imposed a curfew during the election. When Ouattara supporters in Abidjan took to the streets to oppose the move, security forces opened fire, killing five people and injuring many others. In the meantime, the Constitutional Council declared that there had been massive vote-rigging in the north and cancelled 660,000 votes for Ouattara, thereby handing the election to Gbagbo. On 16 December security forces fired on demonstrators, leaving at least eleven civilians dead. There were two main dynamics of post-election violence: urban repressive violence directed against demonstrators, northern Muslims and West African nationals by Gbagbo's forces; and rural violence between indigenous and ethnic minority groups in the country's west, which followed a spiral pattern of reprisals. Upon escalation of the conflict and rising civilian casualties, UNOCI and the French troops highly made joint act against pro Gbagbo forces repeatedly in fever of Ouattara. So its act made by both forces raised a clear question of impartial peacekeeping operation take placed in in Côte d'Ivoire. Therefore, this case study paper discussed UN peacekeeping impartiality in operational facts of the Côte dIvoire.

Chapter One

1. Introduction

1.1Introduction

Africa has been by far the most important regional setting for the peacekeeping operations of the United Nations. During the Cold War period, the sole substantial UN engagement in peacekeeping on the continent, some peace operations have made important contributions to ending conflicts and promoting stability on the continent, the international community's engagement has been inconsistent and has frequently appeared to be linked to narrow interests. There have been clear limits to how far political change could advance. Some observers have gone so far as to argue that the external response to African problems has been characterized by a politics of indifference even though Africa continent has seen a marked increase in political instability during the past decade.

Owing to unfavourable economic conditions. As a result of which, rise in the scale and frequency of interstate war, civil wars and communal violence's. In response these challenges in Africa many have viewed international peacekeeping as a potential source of hope. Over time, the conception of peacekeeping has gradually broadened in scope in contrast with earlier conception of a lightly armed neutral UN peacekeeper the conception is much more activist. Increasingly, the peacekeepers are expected to intervene in specific conflicts, with some measure of force when necessary, in order to facilitate conflict resolution. International peacekeeping forces under UN direction operate in three African countries, with an additional fourteen operation completed during the past decades. Where again civil disorder has led to the deployment of UN forces. However there have been several recent operations that fall in to the category of muscular peacekeeping.

1.2 Background of the Study

From the beginning, Western Côte d'Ivoire's land, security and identity problems make this vast border territory the country's most unstable area. Reconciliation has yet to begin there and communal tensions remain acute. Two administrative regions are especially problematic: Cavally and Guémon. Outside Abidjan, these are the two regions where the post-electoral crisis claimed the most victims and which saw the gravest violence. The Ivorian government's preference for a security clamp-down there, rather than measures to address political and economic problems has done little to address instability, which could provide the spark that reignites the crisis. Since December, the government has taken some steps nationally to lower political tension and promote national reconciliation: these should be immediately extended to these two regions, which remain strongholds of former President Laurent Gbagbo.

Notwithstanding, the central government has ignored Cavally and Guémon when distributing the nation's wealth. These two outlying regions produce a significant proportion of the cocoa that makes Côte d'Ivoire the world's biggest producer, as well as large quantities of other plant-derived raw materials. Yet they missed the "Ivorian miracle" and have remained undeveloped. Their exceptionally fertile land is both a source of wealth and their main problem. Poorly regulated and subject to fierce competition, land ownership is a recurring cause of conflict. Land is a magnet for migrants, both from other parts of the country and from abroad, who often outnumber those "native" to the area and leave them with a strong sense of dispossession.

For a long time, conflicts have been resolved peacefully through local and customary dispute resolution systems. However, the economic crisis, demographic pressures and the spread of a xenophobic political discourse in the 1990s have exhausted these systems. Land conflicts, exploited by the three major political parties that disputed the succession to President Félix

Houphouët-Boigny, have increasingly provoked violence between "native" landowners and migrants.

The government of then-President Henri Konan Bédié tried in 1998 to resolve the situation by introducing a land code that was never enforced. The war in September 2002 and its aftermath then considerably worsened the conflicts. During this period, the violence that affected the west was worse than anywhere else in Côte d'Ivoire, bar the capital Abidjan, with large-scale criminality claiming dozens, even hundreds, of victims. This was partly due to Cavally's and Guémon's strategic location, not only because they produce cocoa but also because they are at the centre of the transport network that takes the raw material to the coast for export. Whoever controls these two regions also controls the country's main source of foreign currency. Among these were the lack of experience and skills in the management of state affairs on the part of newly promoted leaders, hidden and secret agendas and instigation of trouble to justify interferance in their former colonies' affairs, on the part of former metropolis. The disorder engendered by the struggle for independence and/or a difficult transition from colony to new state created too much pressure on the United Nations at the peak of the Cold War. Here the United Nations' support, either in the form of Trusteeship or peacekeeping operations, was the only way to avoid confrontation of Superpowers on the ground of protecting their zone of influence and interests.

Having determined that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1528 (2004) of 27 February 2004, decided to establish UNOCI for an initial period of 12 months as from 4 April 2004. In accordance with the resolution, on that date ONUCI took over from the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI), a political mission set up by the Council in May 2003, and the forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

UNOCI was requested to provide technical, logistical and security support to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and to the IEC. This support included transportation and distribution of national identity and voters' cards, transportation of equipment and other electoral materials, and security

support. In addition, as mandated by Security Council resolution 1765 (2007) the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Head of UNOCI was to certify the outcome of the election.

To bolster security for the elections, on 29 September 2010, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of 500 additional peacekeeping personnel to increase UNOCI's military and police presence from 8,650 to 9,150. This temporary increase for a period of up to six months reinforced the capacity of UNOCI to contribute to security arrangements for the elections, the responsibility for which rests in the first instance with the Ivorian security forces. consequently, this temporary deployment of 500 additional personnel was extended by Council's resolution 1962￼ until 31 March 2011.In addition, on 24 November the Security Council authorized temporary deployment of a maximum of three infantry companies and an aviation unit comprised of two military utility helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI for no longer than four weeks. The deployment of these units was first extended by Council's resolution 1962 of 20 December 2010 for four weeks, and later, by resolution 1968 of 16 February 2011, for additional three months.

In preparation to the second round of elections, UNOCI conducted the national distribution of electoral materials, including non-sensitive electoral materials (ballot boxes, polling booths, electoral kits) by air and road to 70 departments throughout the country, as well as sensitive materials such as the ballot papers, which UNOCI transported by air and by road from Abidjan to the *sous-préfectures* and 415 local electoral commissions.

However, the 2010 presidential election between incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and opposition member Alassane Ouattara resulted in a political stalemate and violent conflict after Gbagbo refused to honor the results that declared Ouattara the winner. The President of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) proclaimed the provisional result of the second round on 2 December 2010: With a high turnout of more than 81%, candidate Alassane Ouattara garnered 54.1% of the votes, while candidate Laurent Gbagbo obtained 45.90%. Immediately following the release of the results, however, Despite mounting international pressure and from within the country, Mr. Gbagbo has refused to accept the outcome of the election. As a result of which, Laurent Gbagbo and AlassaneOuattara has been split along ethnic, regional and

religious grounds. Gbagbo loyalists have been concentrated within the south western Bété ethnic group; votes for Ouattara were primarily from Muslims living in the north. Amid rapidly increasing violence in Abidjan and elsewhere in the country, due to the clear impartiality of UN peacekeeping operation (out of the principles of impartiality).

1.3 Statement of the Problems

The conduct of UN peacekeeping operations in Côte d'Ivoire, in the name of UNOCI remains one of the most important missions beyond traditional conception of Peacekeeping operations; it was the first multifunctional mission comprising both the military and civilian component. It also remains one of the largest UN Peacekeeping Missions ever deployed and operations in UNOCI marked the evolution in the concept of use of force and that of self-defence. However, behind this evolution and success, "some black spots remained".

Notwithstanding the UNOCI intervention in Côte d'Ivoire to protect civilians, including preventing the use of heavy weaponry by Republican Guard and Special Forces who remain loyal to Mr. Gbagbo against them. This stance and actions of UNOCI force was perceived by the supporters of Gbagbo as partisan that exacerbated the conflict and questioned the role of UN forces.

As to some sections of Côte d'Ivoire citizen, the UNOCI operation breached the principle of impartiality of peacekeepers in Côte d'Ivoire and seen as hostile force. The absence of consent among the conflicting parties to the conflict and the actions of the external force instead of defusing conflict aggravated and created sense of fear and insecurity. The mere point here is that, UN operations in Côte d'Ivoire clearly indicated that the UN's actions and the French troops affected the political settlement of an internal dispute between the western and northern part of the country when they try to perform their mission.

It appears that the intervention in Côte d'Ivoire was not based on proper conflict analysis, rather it was a rush move to reduce the expansions of conflict to the other parts of the country. However, the opposite happened that had been a spill over effect to the neighbouring

countries unless the perspectives of all parties are taken into account and accordingly addressed. In connection to this other details shall be discuss in the following chapters.

1.4 Hypothesis of the Study

The following are the null-hypotheses, this case study paper try to either to support or reject;

- To be effective in international peacekeeping operation, the mission Shall takes place on the basis of the consent of disputant or conflicting parties, abstain interference from another government in internal domestic affair of the host country,

- Notwithstanding, international peacekeeping is be guided by Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Therefore it guided by three basic principles: impartiality, Consent and no use massive force. And each activity takes place in the frame of legality during the operation.

1.5 Objectives of the Study

This case study paper has general and specific objectives.

1.5.1 General Objectives of the Study

In order to examine certain impartiality problems regarding of UN international peacekeeping mission, and then to put the possible recommendation upon the basic principle of peacekeeping and to commend ways and strategies of the strengthening and enhancing of the capacity of the concerned wings under UN international peacekeeping mission participant.

1.5.2 Specific Objectives of the Study

The specific objectives of this case study paper are as follows;

- In order to analyses peacekeeping, in which peacekeepers shall act in the interests of international peace and security, rather than the interests of specific states or other external actors.

- In order to re-evaluates the questions of impartiality in peacekeeping through an analysis of the UNOCI operation in Côte d'Ivoire.

- In order to identify the core impartiality problems with respect to the UN international peacekeeping.

1.6 Methodology of the Study

In order to conduct the research, the researchers would us his own memoir that was recorded while the conflict was taking place in Côte d'Ivoire. Besides, the researcher got an opportunity to visit post-conflict country tried to overcome the past scar and trauma.

Further relevant literature on the subject would be consulted with prominent figures, referred to libraries and other documents. Both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis shall be made.

1.6.1 Sources of Reference and Data

This case study paper used both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources shall deals with mainly depends on researchers own memoirs and fieled observation, which coupled with questionnaire and interview with prominent scholars in the field. This include interviewing law and political since professionals and (FGD) focus group dissection with professionals those who work in Côte d'Ivoire Government Bureaus and NGO's. Whereas, secondary sources obtained by reviewing related literature such as books, articles, journals, inter professional discussion and internet.

1.7 Significance of the Study

The significance of this study paper;

- It serves as a starting point as other for further and deep studies of the problems of impartial of peacekeeping.

- It may clearly states core problems of impartial peacekeeping and its impact on two or more disputant parties.

- It could be recommends a possible circumstances or remedies to the questions of impartiality during peacekeeping mission under UN blue-hail met.

1.8 Scope and limitation of the study

This case study paper focused on the aspect surrounding the use of force on the core principles of peacekeeping shall be respected the peacekeepers, on the legalistic angle, the respect of the mandate, hierarchical instructions and directives related to the use of force in UNOCI. Given the importance of the Abidjan (in Côte d'Ivoire), in this respect, the special circumscription of this discussion limited to this area comparatively including Abidjan, during the period from 2011. The main point of this case study paper is that "whether or not the operations in Côte d'Ivoire were a consequence of UN impartiality of peacekeeping operation in the name of UNOCI". In order to determine the eventuality impartiality there is a need to analyze different mandates over the use of Force and its direct impact on the course of the case study paper.

1.9 An Outline of Chapter Headings

An outline of chapter headings shall have four chapters. The first one shall deal with introduction, background of the study, statement of the problem, hypothesis of the study, Objectives of the study; General Objective of the study and Specific objective of the study, methodology of the study, sources of reference and data, significance of the study, scope and limitation of the study, an outline of chapter headings. The second chapter shall deal with peace, peacekeeping role, nature and scope, peacekeeping and its range of activities by the UN, historical back grounds of UN peacekeeping, UN legal basis for peacekeeping and the mandates, UN trained and challenges peace operations in Africa and its outcome related with the sense of impartiality. The third chapter shall deal with impartiality of peacekeeping,

operation in Côte d'Ivoire and its impacts. The fourth chapter shall deal with conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter Two

2. Peace, Peacekeeping Role: Nature and Scope

2. 1 Traditions and Characteristics of peace

2.1.1 Peace

Since the term peace originates most recently from the Anglo-French pes, and the Old French pais, meaning peace, reconciliation, silence, agreement" (11th century), But, Pes itself comes from the Latin pax, meaning "peace, compact, agreement, treaty of peace, tranquillity, absence of hostility, harmony.[1] The English word came into use in various personal greetings from c.1300 as a translation of the Hebrew word shalom, which, according to Jewish theology, comes from a Hebrew verb meaning 'to restore'. Although 'peace' is the usual translation, however, it is an incomplete one, because 'shalom,' which is also cognate with the Arabic salaam, has multiple other meanings in addition to peace, including justice, good health, safety, well-being, prosperity, equity, security, good fortune, and friendliness.[2] At a personal level, peaceful behaviors are kind, considerate, respectful, just, and tolerant of others' beliefs and behaviors tending to manifest goodwill.

Notwithstanding, Peace is between different social groups and characterized by lack of violence or conflict behaviours, and the freedom from fear of violence. Commonly understood as the absence of hostility and retribution, peace also suggests sincere attempts at reconciliation, the existence of healthy or newly healed interpersonal or international relationships, prosperity in

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matters of social or economic welfare, the establishment of equality, and a working political order that serves the true global interests.[3]

Peace is when people are able to resolve their conflicts without violence and can work together to improve the quality of their lives. Peace is when:

1. everyone lives in safety, without fear or threat of violence, and no form of violence is tolerated in law or in practice
2. everyone is equal before the law, the systems for justice are trusted, and fair and effective laws protect people's rights
3. everyone is able to participate in shaping political decisions and the government is accountable to the people
4. everyone has fair and equal access to the basic needs for their wellbeing; such as food, clean water, shelter, education, healthcare and a decent living environment
5. everyone has an equal opportunity to work and make a living, regardless of gender, ethnicity or any other aspect of identity

As the father of peace Johan Galtung stated, often refers to the distinction between 'negative peace' and 'positive peace'. Negative peace refers to the absence of violence. When, for example, a ceasefire is enacted, a negative peace will ensue. It is negative because something undesirable stopped happening. For instance the violence stopped, and the oppression ended. Positive peace is filled with positive content such as restoration of relationships, the creation of social systems that serve the needs of the whole population and the constructive resolution of conflict.[4]

To emphasize Peace does not mean the total absence of any conflict. It means the absence of violence in all forms and the unfolding of conflict in a constructive way.[5] Here the concept of peace is more clearly, understood in comparison with the concept of violence. Sofar there where different forms of violence present in various social relations is, therefore, violence's can be categorized in to two; Direct and Structural violence. Direct violence is the popularly understood meaning of violence and is referred to interims of physical injuries of pain such as killing, beating and verbal abuse whether they happen in war or in inter-personal situations. Direct

violence is personal, visible and manifest, whereas violence in inter-personal relations may be employed as an instrument for robbery, revenge and state use organized violence for political purposes. Whereas, structural violence consists of in egalitarian and discriminatory practices causing human misery like poverty, hunger, repression, and social alienation. This violence discrimination results in denying people basic living standards like decent education, housing and an opportunity to work.

However, therefore Peace exists where people are interacting non-violently and are managing their conflict positively with respectful attention to the legitimate needs and interest of all concerned.

2.2 Peacekeeping and Its Range of Activities by United Nations

2.2.1 Peacekeeping

The term peacekeeping as James has defined it, refers to the international help which is sometimes sent to an immediate problem area when disputing states wish, at least for the time being, to live in peace. Critical to this conception of peacekeeping are that the peace to be kept is one between disputing states, and that these states at least provisionally and temporarily have agreed on some basis for living in peace, which external forces are then called on to help police.[6] This agreement, in turn, creates the conditions for what Margaret Carey has identified as the basic principles of peacekeeping: consent of the states in conflict, peacekeepers should act as impartial, and used force only in self-defense.[7]

2.2.2 The Role of Peacekeeping

The role of peacekeeping fail on boundaries between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-building and peace enforcement have become increasingly blurred. Peace operations are rarely limited to one type of activity.[8] While UN peacekeeping operations are, in principle, deployed to support the implementation of a ceasefire or peace agreement, they are often required to play an active role in peacemaking efforts and may also be involved in early peace-building activities.[9]

Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law. In order to notify that UN peacekeeping operations may use force to defend themselves, their mandate, and civilians, particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide security and maintain public order.[10] we can see it in detailed in the following elastration as per UNOCI mission in Côte d'Ivoire with its clear impartiality.

2.2.3 Peacekeeping Activities to Resolve Conflict under UN

Since peacekeeping has one among a range of activities undertaken by the United Nations to maintain international peace and security throughout the world in which there are certain activities take place by UN.[11] Conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement rarely occur in a linear or sequential ways.[12] Here, the Experience has shown that they should be seen as mutually reinforcing. If they are used piecemeal or in isolation, they fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict and hence reduce the risk of conflict recurring through the following methods.

2.2.4 Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention involves diplomatic measures to keep intra-state or inter-state tensions and disputes from escalating into violent conflict. It includes early warning, information gathering and a careful analysis of the factors driving the conflict.[13] Conflict prevention activities may include the use of the Secretary-General's "good offices," preventive deployment of UN missions or conflict mediation led by the Department of Political Affairs.

2.2.5 Peace Making

Peacemaking generally includes measures to address conflicts in progress and usually involves diplomatic action to bring hostile parties to a negotiated agreement.[14] The UN Secretary-General may exercise his "good offices" to facilitate the resolution of the conflict. Peacemakers may also be envoys, governments, groups of states, regional organizations or the United Nations.

Peacemaking efforts may also be undertaken by unofficial and non-governmental groups, or by a prominent personality working independently.[15]

2.2.6 Peace-Enforcement

Peace enforcement involves the application of a range of coercive measures, including the use of military force. It requires the explicit authorization of the Security Council. It is used to restore international peace and security in situations where the Security Council has decided to act in the face of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression.[16] The Council may utilize, where appropriate, regional organizations and agencies for enforcement action under its authority and in accordance with the UN Charter.[17]

2.2.7 Peace-Building

Peace building aims to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.[18] It is a complex, long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. Peace building measures address core issues that effect the functioning of society and the State, and seek to enhance the capacity of the State to effectively and legitimately carry out its core functions.

2.3 Historical Background of UN Peacekeeping

United Nations Peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East.[19] The mission's role was to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours an operation which became known as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO). Since then, 69 peacekeeping operations have been deployed by the UN, 56 of them since 1988.[20] Over the years, hundreds of thousands of military personnel, as well as tens of thousands of UN police and other civilians from more than 120 countries have participated in UN peacekeeping operations. More than 3,326 UN peacekeepers from some 120 countries have died while serving under the UN flag. Here, we can see UN peacekeeping mission into the following three sections;

2.3.1 Early Age

UN Peacekeeping was born at a time when Cold War rivalries frequently paralyzed the Security Council.[21]

Peacekeeping was primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground, providing crucial support for political efforts to resolve conflict by peaceful means. Those missions consisted of unarmed military observers and lightly armed troops with primarily monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles.[22]

The first two peacekeeping operations deployed by the UN were the UN Truce Supervision Organization and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. Both of these missions, which continue operating to this day, exemplified the observation and monitoring type of operation and had authorized strengths in the low hundreds. The UN military observers were unarmed. [23]

To remember the earliest armed peacekeeping operation was the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) deployed successfully in 1956 to address the Suez Crisis.[24]

Regarding Africa, the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), launched in 1960 was the first large-scale mission having nearly 20,000 military personnel at its peak. ONUC demonstrated the risks involved in trying to bring stability to war-torn regions - 250 UN personnel died while serving on that mission, including the Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold.[25] Furthermore in the 1960s and 1970s, the UN established short-term missions including the Dominican Republic - Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic. West New Guinea (West Irian) - UN Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF), and Yemen - UN Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM), and started longer term deployments in Cyprus - UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the Middle East - UN Emergency Force II (UNEF II), UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).[26]

2.3.2 End of the Cold War

With the end of the Cold War, the strategic context for UN Peacekeeping changed dramatically. [27] UNOCI peacekeepers on patrol in Côte d'Ivoire, 2005. The UN shifted and expanded its field operations from "traditional" missions involving generally observational tasks performed by military personnel to complex "multidimensional" enterprises. These multidimensional missions were designed to ensure the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the foundations for sustainable peace. [28] To be notifying here, the nature of conflicts also changed over the years. UN Peacekeeping, originally developed as a means of dealing with inter-State conflict, was increasingly being applied to intra-State conflicts and civil wars.

UN Peacekeepers were now increasingly asked to undertake a wide variety of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to human rights monitoring, to security sector reform, to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. [29] Although the military remained the backbone of most peacekeeping operations, there were now many faces to peacekeeping including administrators, economists, police officers, legal experts, de-miners, electoral observers, human rights monitors, civil affairs and governance specialists, humanitarian workers, communications and public information experts.

After the Cold War ended, there was a rapid increase in the number of peacekeeping operations. With a new consensus and a common sense of purpose, the Security Council authorized a total of 20 new operations between 1989 and 1994, raising the number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000. Meanwhile Peacekeeping operations established in such countries as Angola - UN Angola Verification Mission I and UN Angola Verification Mission II, Cambodia - UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, El Salvador - UN Observer Mission in El Salvador, Mozambique - UN Operation in Mozambique and Namibia - UN Transition Assistance Group were deployed to:

help implement complex peace agreements;

stabilize the security situation;

re-organize military and police;

Elect new governments and build democratic institutions.

Notwithstanding, at the turn of the century, the UN undertook a major exercise to examine the challenges to peacekeeping in the 1990s and introducing reform. The aim was to strengthen our capacity to effectively manage and sustain field operations.

With a greater understanding of the limits – and potential – of UN Peacekeeping, the UN was asked to perform even more complex tasks. This started in 1999 when the UN served as the administrator of both Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia - UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and in East Timor (now Timor-Leste) - UN Transitional Administration in East Timor which was in the process of gaining independence from Indonesia.[30]

In the following years, the Security Council also established large and complex peacekeeping operations in a number of African countries**:**

Burundi - UN Operation in Burundi ;

Chad and the Central African Republic - UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad ;

Côte d'Ivoire - UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire ;

Democratic Republic of the Congo - UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

Eritrea/Ethiopia - UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea;

Liberia - UN Mission in Liberia ;

Sierra Leone - UN Mission in Sierra Leone ;

Sudan - UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in the south of the country and African Union-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in Darfur), UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS);

Many of these operations have now completed their mandates, including the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB), UN Mission in Sierra

Leone (UNAMSIL) and UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS).

However, in the first decade of the century, UN Peacekeeping found itself stretched like never before and increasingly called upon to deploy to remote, uncertain operating environments and into volatile political contexts.

2.3.3 The Present Situation

Since then UN Peacekeeping has entered a phase of consolidation. The numbers have, for the first time in a decade, started to decline slightly, with the reduction of troops in UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the withdrawal of UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) at the end of 2010.[31] However, this by no means indicates that the challenges faced by the UN are diminishing. While the numbers of military peacekeepers may be decreasing, the demand for field missions is expected to remain high, and peacekeeping will continue to be one of the UN's most complex operational tasks.

Moreover, the political complexity facing peacekeeping operations and the scope of their mandates, including on the civilian side, remain very broad. There are strong indications that certain specialized capabilities including police will be in especially high demand over the coming years.

Today's multidimensional peacekeeping will continue to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.

Peacekeeping has always been highly dynamic and has evolved in the face of new challenges. Recently, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon established a 17-member High-level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations to make a comprehensive assessment of the state of UN peace operations today, and the emerging needs of the future.

2.4 UN Legal Basis for Peacekeeping and Mandates

Since the UN Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Council can establish a UN peacekeeping operation. UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the United Nations Security Council.[32] Therefore, their tasks differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it presents.

2.4.1 UN Legal Basis

The Charter of the United Nations is the foundation document for all the UN work. The UN was established to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security. In which Peacekeeping, although not explicitly provided for in the Charter, has evolved into one of the main tools used by the United Nations to achieve this purpose.[33] The Charter gives the UN Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Council may adopt a range of measures including the establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation.

Chapter VI deals with the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes". UN peacekeeping operations have traditionally been associated with Charter. However, the Security Council need not refer to a specific Chapter of the Charter when passing a resolution authorizing the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation and has never invoked Chapter VI.

Chapter VII contains provisions related to "Action with Respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression'. In recent years, the Council has adopted the practice of invoking Chapter VII of the Charter when authorizing the deployment of UN peacekeeping operations into volatile post-conflict settings where the State is unable to maintain security and public order.[34] The Security Council's invocation of Chapter VII in these situations, in addition to denoting the legal basis for its action, can also be seen as a statement of firm political resolve and a means of reminding the parties to a conflict and the wider UN membership of their obligation to give effect to Security Council decisions.

Chapter VIII of the Charter provides for the involvement of regional arrangements and agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security provided such activities are consistent with the purposes and principles outlined in Chapter I of the Charter.

2.4.2 Peacekeeping Mandates

The UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the United Nations Security Council. Over the years, the range of tasks assigned to UN peacekeeping operations has expanded significantly in response to shifting patterns of conflict and to best address threats to international peace and security.[35] Although each UN peacekeeping operation is different, there is a considerable degree of consistency in the types of mandated tasks assigned by the Security Council. Depending on their mandate, peacekeeping operations may be required to the following:

Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the spill-over of conflict across borders;

Stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to create an environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement;

Assist in implementing comprehensive peace agreements;

Lead states or territories through a transition to stable government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development.

Depending on the specific set of challenges, UN peacekeepers are often mandated to play a catalytic role in the following essentially peace building activities:

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants;

Mine action;

Security sector reform and other rule of law-related activities;

Protection and promotion of human rights;

Electoral assistance;

Support for the restoration and extension of State authority;

Promotion of social and economic recovery and development.

Security Council mandates also reflects a number of cross-cutting, thematic tasks that are regularly assigned to UN peacekeeping operations on the basis of the following landmark Security Council resolutions:

Security Council resolution 1325 (2000)on women, peace and security;

Security Council resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict;

Security Council resolution 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict

As a result of which, Peacekeeping has proven to be one of the most effective tools available to the UN to assist host countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. And Peacekeeping has unique strengths, including legitimacy, burden sharing, and an ability to deploy and sustain troops and police from around the globe, integrating them with civilian peacekeepers to advance multidimensional mandates, like to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.

Notwithstanding, UN Peacekeepers provide security and the political and peace building support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to peace. In which the peacekeeping operation in any situation shall be respected or guided by three basic principles.[36] Those principles are as follows;

that it should take place with the consent of the states in conflict;

that the peacekeepers should act as impartial brokers; and

that force should be used only in self-defence.

So far, Peacekeeping is flexible and over the past two decades has been deployed in many configurations.

2.5 UN Trained and Challenges Peace Operations in Africa and its Outcome Related With the Sense of Impartiality

2.5.1 UN Trained Peacekeeping Operation in Africa

From the beginning, UN peacekeeping mission in Africa has had reflected the dilemmas that any attempt to resolve often intense and intractable problems would have confronted. Even in cases where the UN may be regarded as having failed (and it has also had some important successes), there is generally little to suggest that another organization, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU) , would have done any better. Nonetheless, the UN does bring to the task not only some distinctive capabilities, but also a number of weaknesses.[37]

On the positive side, it has the enormous advantage of constituting the world's sole global political organisation, with the authority to act (to the extent that it is able to obtain agreement among its leading members) on behalf of the international community as a whole. In so far as there is anything that can be described as 'the international community', the UN is its voice. Against that, its weaknesses, to a large extent, are the mirror image of its strengths. The end of the Cold War, while liberating the UN to play something approaching the task envisaged by its founders in 1945.

The five permanent members (P5) of the Security Council. Deployment of any force requires the support of two-thirds of the members of the Security Council (currently nine out of fifteen), and the absence of a veto from any of the P5. The UN is thus not an autonomous actor, but the expression of an international consensus, to the extent that it is possible to obtain. This issue on the whole, has been less problematic in Africa than in much of the rest of the world. The continent did not form one of the major focuses for superpower hegemony or competition (unlike, say, Central America and Central Europe on the one hand, or the Middle East and South-east Asia on the other), so that compromise between the superpowers was more readily obtained here than elsewhere. This helps to account for the relative success of both ONUC (despite some

major differences between the United States and the Soviet Union), and of the Angola-Namibia accords of 1988.[38] It is also worth noting that, although Africa's two major former colonial powers, the United Kingdom and France, are among the P5, no major UN operation (among which would be included those in Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Somalia and Western Sahara) has taken place in former French or British colonies, except for Somalia which includes the former British Somaliland. While the British or (especially) French presence on the Security Council has sometimes been significant, for example, in obtaining UN authority for the controversial Operation in Rwanda in 1994, it has affected the role of the UN in Africa far less than might have been expected. The role of the US, on the other hand, has been critical on occasion, most obviously in Somalia, but also in the tragically misguided decision to withdraw the bulk of forces deployed in the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from the country at the outbreak of the genocide in April 1994.[39]

In addition to, due to internal politics of such a large and peculiarly constructed organization as the UN have also affected the management of peacekeeping operations in Africa. These have not only included the relationship between the secretariat (and especially the Secretary-General) and the P5 states, but also that between headquarters in New York and operations on the ground. Secretaries-General, invariably drawn from fairly small states tend to favour a more activist role than the major powers, and one which the US in particular has been reluctant to pay for. Nor has the standing of the Secretary-General himself been entirely beyond question: regional perceptions of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's actions in the Horn of Africa were deeply affected by policies with which he had been associated in his previous position in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry. In the case of both Somalia and Rwanda to revert to two of the most traumatic experiences of attempted peacekeeping in Africa, the UN found itself both at odds with the leader of its operations on the ground (Mahomed Sahnoun in Somalia, Romeo Dallaire in Rwanda), and on other occasions unable to exercise operational control over forces (US Rangers in Somalia, the French in Rwanda) which were at least technically deployed under its authority. UN, moreover, has had to act in collaboration with both major member states and with regional organisations and powers. This was indeed envisaged in the UN Charter, but in practice has meant that, rather than laying down the framework of a global order that would be implemented

through other organisations at the regional level, it has had to put together coalitions of states and organisations in order to operate at all, in the process becoming the prisoner of its allies to some extent. At least in Africa, this has been most the evident in Liberia, where the UN only entered the scene as an adjunct to the regional initiative put together by the Economic Community of West African States which in itself, was heavily under the influence of the hegemonic ambitions of its major state, Nigeria, and indeed the personal contacts and economic interests of Nigeria's rulers.[40] That Nigeria had a government that was both military and notoriously corrupt added to the embarrassment, but did nothing to alter the fact that no settlement was possible without Nigerian engagement.

In the abortive Arusha agreement on Rwanda, the UN was brought in to assist in guaranteeing a settlement negotiated in association with the OAU, whose Secretary General, former Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Salim Ahmed Salim was anxious to use it to enhance the organisation's standing in the resolution of conflicts within African member states. On some occasions, as for example in Mozambique, the UN's ability to work with a broadly united set of regional states has greatly enhanced its capacity. On others, as in Somalia, the endemic conflicts of the Horn meant that there was no effective regional security structure to back up the UN intervention, a deficiency scarcely rectified by attempts to bring, in addition to the OAU, the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in on the act. In short, regional partnerships are often unavoidable, and are usually essential to success, but also place constraints on the kind of settlement that the UN is able to seek. To remind here the United Nations is thus a cumbersome participant in the attempted settlement of Africa's fluid and complex conflicts.

Whatever the appeal of 'African solutions to African problems', neither the AU nor individual African states or sub-regional organizations have the resources required to reach and implement such solutions. Nor have attempts by individual external states to create frameworks for regional security in Africa led to anything more than a slanging match between the two most prominent of these states, the US and France. Some African conflicts have generated an extraordinary proliferation of 'special envoys' from all manner of regional organisations attempting to negotiate settlements, at best only in partial collaboration with one another.[41]

Here is that UN, for all its problems, is the only body capable of super imposing any global coherence on the search for regional order.

2.5.2 UN Challenges of Peacekeeping Operation in Africa

The problems that the UN has had to face in Africa also reflect the peculiar difficulties of peacekeeping itself, and the wide divergence between what may be regarded as the 'classic' role of peacekeeping and, especially in Africa, the kinds of conflict which the UN and other would be peacekeepers have been called on to resolve. No major African peacekeeping operation, whether undertaken by the UN or by anyone else, has met the conditions.[42] Most importantly, no such operation has involved any conflict between states at all. Direct conflicts between states in Africa have been relatively rare, and none of those that have taken place have involved any substantial commitment of resources to peacekeeping operations. At most, they have involved only relatively low-level attempts at mediation or demarcation, by the UN in the case of the Nigeria-Cameroon and Chad-Libya border disputes, and by other states and organisations in the dispute between Eritrea and Yemen. Virtually all African conflicts which have involved external peacekeepers or peacemakers have been conflicts within states, even though such conflicts have often involved as a result of the permeability of Africa's state frontiers, and tacit or overt support for conflicting parties by external states an international dimension.[43]

The point here that to notifying, UN, like other international organisations, is an organisation of states: it is indeed the global 'trade union' of states. The UN Charter rests on the distinction between 'domestic' and 'international' spheres at critical points, and the organisation has only very limited powers to intervene in matters which concern the domestic jurisdiction of states. Chapter VII of the UN Charter does permit the UN to concern itself with any issue that presents a threat to international peace and security, a formula that has been used to enable it to involve itself in a number of essentially internal conflicts, including the issue of apartheid in South Africa, for example, but that it should become involved at all in the issues that have captured its attention in Africa is at least paradoxical.

Owing to, the state-centeredness of the UN instantly renders the premise of impartiality extremely problematic.[44] While it is possible for an institution formed in this way to remain impartial in issues concerning two or more of its own member states, it is scarcely possible for it to remain so with regard to conflicting parties which are states and ones which are not. For a start, it normally requires the consent of the state concerned to become involved in the conflict in the first place and such consent is only likely to be given if the government concerned believes that such involvement will benefit itself.

Furthermore, the operating principles and assumptions of institutions formed by states will almost inevitably incline them towards solutions conceived in statist terms, notably the maintenance of the territorial integrity of an existing state, and the extension of effective state control over the whole of its territory. This obviously does not vitiate the possibility of the UN becoming involved in conflict-resolution in Africa, or at least sometimes, of such involvement being successful. It does mean, however, that it is only likely to be successful if the parameters of the eventual resolution are implicitly accepted from the outset.[45] It was implicit, for example, in the resolution of the conflicts both in Mozambique (where it was generally successful) and in Angola (where it tragically failed) that the respective incumbent governments of the Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique (Frelimo) and the Movimento Popular de Libertaçao de Angola (MPLA) would stay in power, and that the conflict resolution processes would essentially involve the negotiation of appropriate 'side payments' (such as specified positions in central government, or a limited degree of autonomy in running the governments of particular regions) to the main opposition group. It is barely possible to conceive what would have happened had Frelimo or the MPLA lost their respective elections to the National Resistance Movement in Mozambique (Renamo) or the União Nacional para aIndependência de Angola (UNITA), and the insurgents had consequently demanded the right to form new governments in Maputo or Luanda. One can safely assume, however, that no smooth handover would have occurred. It was the recognition by key elements in the incumbent National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development (MRNDD) power structure that the full acceptance of the Arusha Peace Agreement would have involved their exclusion from power that triggered the Rwandan genocide of 1994. It is almost equally inconceivable that the UN could carry the responsibility for a peace settlement that involved the dismemberment of the territory of an existing state.

Once the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia had been agreed to by the two governments concerned, for example, it was possible for the UN to become involved (in a very limited capacity) to validate the results of the subsequent referendum through which the division was formally legitimated. For the UN to propose such a separation in the first place, against the opposition of the Ethiopian government, would scarcely have been possible. The fact that peacekeepers (or the states that send them) inevitably arrive with implicit agendas of their own creates difficulties in the relationship between the peacekeepers and the 'peacekept' In particular, those whose prospects for success are diminished by the presence of peacekeepers will treat them with suspicion or hostility, even if they have been induced by external pressure to agree to their arrival in principle. In turn, this is likely to lead to incidents, often of an apparently quite trivial kind, which serve to deepen suspicions on either side, and may eventually lead as most obviously in the breakdown of relations first between the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and subsequently the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and Mahomed Farah Aidid-to the outbreak of open conflict between the peacekeepers and one of the domestic parties. It was likewise evident that the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) was implicitly hostile to Savimbi and UNITA (and for very good reason, many would add), and that relations between the two were always liable to break down, whereas relations between UNAVEM and the government in Luanda, however strained they sometimes may have been, rested on the solid understanding that both were ultimately trying to achieve the same objective of a settlement to the war that would leave the MPLA in power.

The engagement in peacekeeping operations in civil conflicts, inherently more invidious and usually also more hazardous than the simple interposition of a peacekeeping force between states that have already agreed to the conditions for its deployment, also raises tricky questions about the composition of the force itself. Operations of this kind, of which the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia provide non-African examples, are less likely to be restricted to forces provided by the generally small, distant and neutral states which have formed the backbone of 'classical' peacekeeping operations. They are more likely to draw on major states which have hegemonic ambitions (which also, of course, involve hegemonic responsibilities) that, in turn, affect perceptions of their neutrality. The extreme case of such hegemonic involvement is that of French forces in Opération Turquoise, but the leading roles of the US in UNITAF, and of Nigeria

in the the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force in Liberia, are equally clear.[46]

Therefore, peacekeeping in Africa has been plunged into the most intractable problems in attempting to maintain some kind of order on one of the world's most violent and unstable continents. For them the relatively straightforward tasks of merely policing agreements between states are not an option. They have been called on, rather, to prop up (or re-create) collapsing states; to intervene in vicious civil wars; and to negotiate and, if need be, enforce peace settlements among conflicting parties whose commitment to any peaceful resolution of conflicts was often at best extremely uncertain, and at worst no more than a misleading behind which to prepare a resumption of hostilities. The situations which they encountered on the ground, have often been quite different from what they had expected, and the twists and turns of the conflicting parties have required the managers of operations on the ground to redefine their missions, in frantic communication with a political leadership outside the conflict zone which saw things in a very different light. Their own motives have been called into question, and the motives of different states engaged in the same operation have not always been consistent. The support of a united international community could not be taken for granted.

The Individual states and international institutions take part in peacekeeping operations for a mixture of motives. These certainly include the hope of building a better kind of international system, rudely shaken though many of these hopes have been during the post-Cold War period with which the preceding discussion is concerned. Such motives often encompass the feeling that, even if the prospects for success seem to be slight, the UN or regional organisations cannot simply stand by and do nothing: it may be better to try and fail, than not to try at all. In some cases and here the US engagement in Somalia comes to mind -media pressure may be such that 'something must be done'. States and international institutions equally take part in such operations because of interests, by no means necessarily bad ones, of their own. It is therefore a futile exercise to prescribe to the UN, or to anyone else, how they should react to pressures to participate in peacekeeping operations in Africa. It is they who have to take decisions, and not the academics.

In addition to this, two final conclusions may be drawn which are both short and obvious. First of all, the extent of what the UN can achieve to mitigate the consequences of conflict in Africa, though not entirely negligible, is nonetheless extremely limited, and no great hopes and expectations should be placed on it. Secondly, in cases where peacekeeping operations do take place, there is a substantial body of experience, much of it bitter, which can and should be used in order to enhance the prospects for relative success, and to limit the dangers of causing actual damage, in approaching the always hazardous and often dispiriting task of trying to promote international peace and security in Africa.

2.5.3 The Questions of Impartiality of UN Peacekeeping Operation

From the beginning, the idea of a peacekeeping force intervening (into a country) in order to stabilize a conflict area, was developed in the Security Council in response to the Suez crisis in 1956. It was considered crucial that the UN acted impartially since some of the permanent members of the Security Council were involved in the conflict. When the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was established in 1956.[47] Here the principles of impartiality were reaffirmed.

The principles of impartiality have often been interlinked but they do have different meanings and significance. Neutrality usually means not taking sides with warring parties and impartiality refers to non discrimination and proportionality. Neutrality is often associated with passivity and inaction.[48]

The principles of impartiality have traditionally been regarded as essential for UN peacekeeping operations. In according to Chapter VII, Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations is considered to be the legal basis of peacekeeping operations and its principle. It states that "In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned." (UN Charter, 1945)

Notwithstanding, the principles of neutrality and impartiality have been interlinked and regarded as synonymous, impartiality has been regarded as a foundation of UN peacekeeping operations. The United Nations General Guidelines for Peacekeeping Operations (of 1995) says that

"Impartiality must not promote inaction. Peacekeepers must discharge their tasks firmly and objectively, without fear or favour. Neither side should gain unfair advantages as a result of the activities of a peacekeeping operation."

This definition talks about both the impartiality regarding the Security Council Mandate as well as the impartiality of the implementation of the mandate. Peacekeeping activities must be in conformity with the mandate. They need to be even handed and regarded as not discriminating towards either of the parties to the conflict.[49] This can be problematic in cases where the UN is taking action against one side of the conflict. For example, in cases where the UN operation is using force against one side of the conflict in order to prevent mass murder, rape, ethnic cleansing or genocide, it is regarded as not acting impartially, but as simply acting according to the mandate.

The idea that the UN should be impartial was strongly emphasized during the Cold War, when tension between the two superpowers, the U.S. and Russia, created conflicts regarding peacekeeping operations around the world. The impartiality was then regarded as important in order to maintain cooperation between the superpowers in the Security Council. In the post- cold war period, the changing international environment, as well as expanded roles and tasks of UN peacekeeping operations have affected the principles of impartiality. The dilemmas of these principles were increasingly debated and questioned due to the UN acted impartially since some of the permanent members of the Security Council were involved in the conflict. As a result of which the Secretary- General Dag Hammarskjold outlined these principles in a report saying that the operation would not influence the military balance in the present conflict and thereby the political balance affecting the efforts to settle the conflict.[50] However, the above expresses ions indicates that of a non- prejudicial attitude has been interpreted into the ideas impartiality. For instance, This issues or crisis in Afghanistan and Iraq have blurred the lines between humanitarian and political action and thus affected the core principles of neutrality and impartiality. For peacekeeping operations dealing with complex political and contested conflicts, the principles of impartiality have been increasingly difficult to follow.

Chapter Three

3. Impartial Peacekeeping Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and Its Impacts
3.1 The 2010 Political Crisis and UNOCI Impartial Peacekeeping Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Since the 2010 presidential election between incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and opposition member Alassane Ouattara resulted in a political stalemate and violent conflict after Gbagbo refused to honor the results that declared Ouattara the winner. The President of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) proclaimed the provisional result of the second round on 2 December 2010: With a high turnout of more than 81%, candidate Alassane Ouattara earned 54.10% of the votes, while candidate Laurent Gbagbo obtained 45.90%. Immediately following the release of the results, however, despite mounting international pressure and from within the country, Mr. Gbagbo has refused to accept the outcome of the election as certified by the United Nations and to step down. As of April 2011, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon reported that over 1000 civilians had died as a result of clashes, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees stated that more than 500,000 Ivoirians were forcibly displaced, and 94,000 Ivoirians fled to neighbouring Liberia out of fear of violence. Forces loyal to both Gbagbo and Ouattara were failing to protect civilians and were accused of gross human rights violations that could amount to crimes against humanity. In an effort to protect the people of Côte d'Ivoire from further atrocities, a military operation began on 4 April following a statement by the UN Secretary-General in which he instructed UN Operations in Côte D'Ivoire (UNOCI) to take the necessary measures to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population.[51]

To remind you here that, the 2010 Political Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, due to two   Support for presidential candidates Laurent Gbagbo and AlassaneOuattara has been split along ethnic,

regional and religious grounds. Gbagbo loyalists have been concentrated within the southwestern Bété ethnic group; votes for Ouattara were primarily from Muslims living in the north. The first-round of presidential polls took place in a generally peaceful environment, although UNHCR reported acts of voter intimidation and obstruction of movement. The initial election did not yield a winner and a second electoral round was held on November 28, 2010. The independent Electoral Commission (CEI) released the polling results on December 2, 2010 and declared Ouattara the new president of Côte d'Ivoire after he received 54.1% of the vote. The Election results were declared invalid by the President of the Constitutional Council and Gbagbo ally, Paul Yao N'dre, after it was determined that the CEI did not release the results the December 1 deadline. Here the disputes election results created a political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire in which Gbagbo and Ouattara both claimed victory and established governments in the city of Abidjan. AlassaneOuattara established his seat of government at the Hotel du Golf in Abidjan which was then barricaded by military forces loyal to Gbagbo.[52] Alassane Ouattara received military support from the northern rebel militia, the Forces Nouvelles.[53]

As a result of which the political stalemate turned violent and caused the decline of state security, threatened regional stability, and resulted in gross human rights violations and violence against civilians.[54] In accordance the UN reported in March 2011 that over 1000 people were killed in clashes, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees stated that over 500,000 Ivorians were forcibly displaced, and 94,000 Ivoirians fled to neighbouring Liberia out of fear of violence. Forces loyal to Gbagbo and Ouattara were accused of gross human rights against civilians which could amount to crimes against humanity.[55]

Furthermore, the escalation of violence and a humanitarian crisis rapidly increasing violence in Abidjan and elsewhere in the country, the flow of refugees fleeing the country rose dramatically.[56]

UNHCR reported on 1 March that the number of Ivorian refugees in Liberia had reached almost 70,000, with another 40,000 internally displaced within Côte d'Ivoire. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Play warned of an unfolding humanitarian crisis and that civilians were at grave risk from a flare-up of violence in Abidjan and the west of Ivory Coast, as UNHCR

reported that some 200,000 people had fled their homes in Abobo, leaving it almost completely deserted after heavy fighting.

In New York, the Security Council voiced deep concern at the escalating attacks on civilians in Côte d'Ivoire, the increasing numbers of refugees and displaced persons and the risk of a resurgence of the civil war. After meeting in Mauritania on 4 March, the AU High-Level Panel called for order in Côte d'Ivoire and a lifting of the Golf Hotel blockade. The AU Peace and Security Council, meeting on 10 March 2011 in Addis Ababa at the level of Heads of State and Government, reaffirmed all its previous decisions on the post-electoral crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, recognizing Mr. Ouattara as the country's President of Côte d'Ivoire. At the same time the UN Security Council welcomed this AU's decision and its intention to appoint a High Representative for the implementation of an overall political solution in Côte d'Ivoire.[57] But in this situation, UN doesn't highly concern to see and made alternative dispute resolution methods rather military and political support to Mr. Ouattara impartially.[58]

Meanwhile, the overall situation in the country continued with a sharp increase in inter-communal and inter-ethnic confrontations. Human rights abuses, including rapes, abductions and killings, are being committed by people supporting both sides. The humanitarian situation also reaching alarming proportions, the United Nations scaled up efforts to provide food aid to the increasing number of people fleeing from escalating post-election violence in Côte d'Ivoire, amid concerns that the international community has not given adequate attention to the humanitarian crisis sparked by the fighting.[59]

Escalating insecurity in the country saw a sharp rise in displacement.[60] UNHCR estimated on 25 March, up to a million people may have fled the economic capital Abidjan alone after weeks of bloody street clashes with some 100,000 Ivoirians seeking refugee in neighbouring Liberia. According to UNOCI, the total number of deaths since mid-December 2010 stood at 462 as of 24 March with 52 killed in the past week alone.

Confronted with new challenges and increased level of violence, UNOCI continued to do everything possible within its mandate and resources to protect civilians and contain proliferating violence Valerie Amos, the head of UN humanitarian and emergency relief operations, stressed

the light of civilians caught up in the fighting.[61] The escalation of violence and use of heavy weaponry, particularly in urban areas, is taking an increasing toll on civilians.. In Geneva, the UN Human Rights Council set up an independent, international commission of inquiry to investigate allegations of serious abuses and human rights violations in Côte d'Ivoire caused by both sides. The Council approved a resolution proposed by Nigeria on behalf of the African Group recognizing the election of Mr. Ouattara as Ivorian president, condemning "atrocities" and expressing concern about "the seriousness and extent" of the abuses.[62]

Owing to the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1962 on December 20, 2010 which extended the mandate of UNOCI through June 30, 2011 and provided additional troops and personnel support to the mission. Following a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council on the situation in Côte d'Ivoire, the UN Security Council unanimously voted on January 19, 2011 to send an additional 2,000 UNOCI forces in the country.[63] UNOCI deployed forces to the Hotel du Golf to protect Ouattara and his Government. The Security Council met again on the issue of Côte d'Ivoire on 30 March and unanimously adopted Resolution 1975, which issued targeted sanctions on Gbagbo and his inner circle, and stressed the support given to the mission to use all necessary means within its mandate to protect civilians under threat. The Resolution stated that attacks that have targeted civilians could amount to crimes against humanity, and reaffirmed the primary responsibility of all States to protect civilians. Here the confirmation of UNOCI that pro-Gbagbo forces had used mortars and heavy machine guns and targeted UN staff and vehicles contradict with Human Rights Watch reported that pro-Gbagbo forces targeted immigrants from West African countries. So that it was clear that UNOCI impartiality when to its missions and made preconditions that declared war against pro-Gbagbo forces in the name of civilian protection and at the same time to protect Ouattara and his Government.[64] Again UNOCI stand on beside Ouattara, through protection rather to see the situations to resolve through conflict resolution methods including to form coalition government and/or transitional government in order to mitigate or ban the conflicts that arouse between Ouattara and Gbagbo supporters from individual to provincial level.

In addition to that, after months of defying the outcome of the presidential election, Laurent Gbagbo was arrested by Ouattara forces on 11 April 2011 following an attack on his residence in Abidjan through UNOCI and France troops assistance. Alassane Ouattara immediately called for

the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission, which Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon voiced support for. The Secretary-General urged President Ouattara to ensure that there was no retaliation against Gbabgo supporters.[65] whereas, Amnesty International echoed this concern in its statement on 12 April 2011 in which the organization declared that "perceived supporters of former Côte d'Ivoire President Laurent Gbagbo are at risk of violent reprisals, despite President AlassaneOuattara's call for Ivorians to "abstain from all forms of reprisals and violence. This also shows UNOCI impartiality when perform its mission and impliedly support in all necessary actions to protect M.r Ouattara.[66]

However, resolution 1981, extended the mandate UNOCI until 31 July 2011. The Council also extended up to 30 June the temporary redeployment from UNMIL to UNOCI of three infantry companies, one aviation unit comprising two military utility helicopters and three armed helicopters with crews. In such situation designating UNOCI troops as foreign invaders, Gbagbo called on his supporters to target them. As a result of this call to violence, UNOCI personnel have been injured and assets have been destroyed by armed combatants on both sides of the conflict.

Consequently, Western Côte d'Ivoire's land, security and identity problems make this vast border territory the country's most unstable area. Reconciliation has yet to begin there and communal tensions remain acute. Two administrative regions are especially problematic: Cavally and Guémon. Outside Abidjan, these are the two regions where the post-electoral crisis claimed the most victims and which saw the gravest violence. The Ivorian government's preference for a security clamp-down there, rather than measures to address political and economic problems have done little to address instability, which could provide the spark that ignites the crisis. Since December, the government has taken some steps nationally to lower political tension and promote national reconciliation: these should be immediately extended to these two regions, which remain strongholds of former President Laurent Gbagbo. This was partly due to Cavally's and Guémon's strategic location, not only because they produce cocoa but also because they are at the centre of the transport network that takes the raw material to the coast for export. Whoever controls these two regions also controls the country's main source of foreign currency.

During the 2011 post-electoral crisis, further massacres took place in Cavally and Guémon. The gravest, with a death toll of hundreds in just a few days, took place in the town of Duékoué. Then, in July 2012, more than one year after the end of the crisis, other violent crimes were committed at the Nahibly camp for the internally displaced, just outside Duékoué. In 2013, several incursions into Côte d'Ivoire by Liberian and Ivorian militia from Liberia claimed further victims and displaced thousands. These recent events proved just how volatile these two regions are, and showed they are likely to be the first to boil over if political tensions increase.

Upon escalation of the conflict and rising civilian casualties, regional leaders urged the Security Council to give UNOCI a stronger mandate. The result was Resolution 1975 (March 2011), which tasked UNOCI, along with the aid of French troops, with "impartially implementing its mandate, to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect in the name of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian population. To indicate here is that, the UN Security Council deemed that civilians were under threat of imminent violence: pro-Gbagbo forces repeatedly fired rocket-propelled grenades against UNOCI personnel and used armoured carriers equipped with machine guns to fire indiscriminately at civilians. UNOCI had the right to use force in self defense and had the mandate to protect those citizens and do what they could to destroy the weapons. Consequently, UNOCI has come under scrutiny for its use of force against Gbagbo's compound and weaponry. In light of criticism, it is important to reflect on the meaning of "impartiality" and remind skeptics that UNOCI was not obligated to remain neutral in the conflict.[67]

For better understanding, the UNOCI peacekeeping operation failed in the question of impartiality that from April 4 to Gbagbo's surrender on April 10, UNOCI launched strikes against Gbagbo facilities and pro-Gbagbo heavy weaponry in a pro-active effort to protect civilians in the commercial capital of Abidjan. The UN's decision to act during this volatile time has made it easy for those opposed to the mission to portray it as an international intervention aimed at deposing Gbagbo and therefore an overstep of its mandate. Critics included Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov who claimed, "The peacekeepers have a mandate which obliged them to stay neutral and impartial." This serves to remind us that even those involved in UN affairs do not always differentiate between the concepts of "impartiality" and "neutrality."

However, even though UNOCI entitled the power of self defense on the basis of UN charter VII, in such situation shows that the given operation failed in the question of impartiality. Because in operation the UNOCI and the French troops highly made joint act against pro Gbagbo forces repeatedly in fever of Ouattara. So its act made by both forces raised a clear question of impartial peacekeeping operation in the name of UNOCI.[68]

Chapter four

4. Conclusion and Recommendation

4.1 Conclusion

United Nations Peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East. The mission's role was to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours an operation which became known as the UNTSO. Since then, 69 peacekeeping operations UN peacekeeping operations are deployed on the basis of mandates from the United Nations Security Council. Their tasks differ from situation to situation, depending on the nature of the conflict and the specific challenges it present. The Charter of the United Nations is the foundation document for all the UN work. The UN was established to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and one of its main purposes is to maintain international peace and security.

Owing to, the African post-independence period had been one of the most critical eras in the history of many nations. Some had a smooth and peaceful transition, while other went through tumultuous situations necessitating international support of various natures. Many factors justified the sudden eruption of violent conflicts in newly decolonized states. Among these were the lack of experience and skills in the management of state affairs on the part of newly promoted leaders, hidden and secret agendas and instigation of trouble to justify immix ion in their former colonies' affairs, on the part of former metropolis. The disorder engendered by the struggle for independence and/or a difficult transition from colony to new state created to having determined that the situation in Côte d'Ivoire continued to pose a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security

Council, by its resolution 1528 (2004) of 27 February 2004, decided to establish UNOCI for an initial period of 12 months as from 4 April 2004. In accordance with the resolution, on that date ONUCI took over from the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire MINUCI, a political mission set up by the Council in May 2003,

Meanwhile, UNOCI provided technical, logistical and security support to the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and to the IEC. This support included transportation and distribution of national identity and voters' cards, transportation of equipment and other electoral materials, and security support. In addition, as mandated by Security Council resolution 1765 (2007) the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Head of UNOCI was to certify the outcome of the election.

In addition, on 24 November the Security Council authorized temporary deployment of a maximum of three infantry companies and an aviation unit comprised of two military utility helicopters from UNMIL to UNOCI for no longer than four weeks. The deployment of these units was first extended by Council's resolution 1962 of 20 December 2010 for four weeks, and later, by resolution 1968 of 16 February 2011, for additional three months.

All such deeds in the preparation to the second round of elections, UNOCI conducted the national distribution of electoral materials, including non-sensitive electoral materials (ballot boxes, polling booths, electoral kits) by air and road to 70 departments throughout the country, as well as sensitive materials such as the ballot papers, which UNOCI transported by air and by road from Abidjan to the *sous-préfectures*and 415 local electoral commissions.

Côte d'Ivoire had been plunged into turmoil following incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo's refusal to conceded defeat in the 28 November 2010 second round of elections to his opponent, former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara. On 11 April, following military operations conducted by forces loyal to President Alassane Ouattara, UNOCI and French Licorne troops. Amid rapidly increasing violence in Abidjan and elsewhere in the country, due to the clear impartiality of UN peacekeeping operation out of the principles of impartiality since grant authorization power in order to certify the outcome of the election to UNOCI.

For better understanding, here the UNOCI peacekeeping operation failed in the question of impartiality that from April 4 to Gbagbo's surrender on April 10, UNOCI launched strikes against Gbagbo facilities and pro-Gbagbo heavy weaponry in a pro-active effort in the name of to protect civilians in the commercial capital of Abidjan

Initially the state-centeredness of the UN instantly renders the premise of impartiality extremely problematic. While it is possible for an institution formed in this way to remain impartial in issues concerning two or more of its own member states, it is scarcely possible for it to remain so with regard to conflicting parties which are states and ones which are not. For a start, it normally requires the consent of the state concerned to become involved in the conflict in the first place (if it can identify such a state and in Somalia it could not); and such consent is only likely to be given if the government concerned believes that such involvement will benefit itself.

4.2 Recommendation

Forced to fight five years for the power, there were the military fractured, and thousands of civilians and innocent peoples were killed. November election should have given peacefully; Côte d'Ivoire's president now faces multiple urgent challenges to keep the country from fragmenting. The President must take on security, justice, political dialogue and the economy and explains that he must above all aims for national reconciliation in all key decisions. The international community's importantly the UN, which maintains a crucial peacekeeping force UNOCI in the country needs to work with him to fill security vacuums, facilitate an inclusive political dialogue,

"The new government must not underestimate the threats that still endanger peace", says Gilles Yabi, Crisis Group's West Africa Project Director. "It must avoid becoming drunk with power in the manner that has led its predecessors to make so many disastrous decisions during the last two decades".

Security is the first challenge for the government. The Forces Nouvelles, the former insurgency that in large part enabled Ouattara to oust Gbagbo, must be disbanded, and its economic control mechanism ended. UN troops should help fill the vacancy it leaves and design new ways to collect arms scattered around the country as per in the principle of impartiality. A vetting

mechanism is needed to identify and keep out of the new army that is being formed those from the former forces as well as ex-rebels who committed serious violence.

It is essential that the true reconciliation process begins as possible. The Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission must quickly show it truly independent and credible. The justice system needs to investigate crimes by both sides, and the president should ask the International Criminal Court to look into the most serious offences committed since 2010,(not only those that followed last election) but also after election. The present government should open political space for the opposition, including by engaging former members of Gbagbo's party in dialogue, so that there can be broad participation in the independent legislative elections.

"The president needs to make courageous decisions about security, justice and economic revival and includes a sense of reconciliation in each decision," says Comfort Ero, Crisis Group's Africa Program Director. "His coming to power must not overshadow the fact that Côte d'Ivoire remains fragile and unstable".

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UN Security Council press statement, condemning "in the strongest terms" acts of violence; warning all Ivorian stakeholders that they will be held accountable for attacks against civilians and will be brought to justice; and urging them to exercise maximum restraint, remain calm, resist provocative actions, refrain from violence, and work together to restore sustainable peace.

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Appendix 1. The UN master list of numbered Rules of engagement

UN master list of numbered rules of engagement

Provisional, May 2002

1. The following ROE, when authorised, permit United Nations armed military personnel to use force in the circumstances specified below. However, the principle of minimum necessary force is to be observed at all times.

2. The United Nations Master List contains five sets of rules: Use of Force (Rule 1), Use of Weapon Systems (Rule 2), Authority to carry Weapons (Rule 3), Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm (Rule 4) and Reaction to Civil Action/Unrest (Rule 5). The list provides various options from which a selection will be made under each of the five rules, to suit a specific UNPKO

Rule 1. Use of force

Rule No. 1.1

Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to defend oneself and other UN personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent is authorised.

Rule No. 1.21

Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to defend other international personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent is authorised.

Rule No. 1.3

Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to resist attempts to abduct or detain oneself and other UN personnel is authorised.

1 This Rule can only be included in addition to Rule 1.1 if consistent with the mandate of the UNPKO.

Rule No. 1.42

Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to resist attempts to abduct or detain other international personnel is authorised.

Rule No. 1.5

Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to protect United Nations' installations, areas or goods, designated by the Head of the Mission in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act is authorised.

Rule No. 1.6

Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect key installations, areas or goods designated by the Head of the Mission in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act is authorised.

OR:

Rule No. 1.7

Use of force, excluding deadly force, to protect key installations, areas or goods, designated by the Head of the Mission in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act is authorised.

Rule No. 1.8

Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, to defend any civilian person who is in need of protection against a hostile act or hostile intent, when competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance, is authorised. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

2 This Rule can only be included in addition to Rule 1.3 if consistent with the mandate of the UNPKO.

3 This Rule can only be included in addition to Rule 1.5 if consistent with the mandate of the UNPKO.

Rule No. 1.9

Use of force, excluding deadly force, to prevent the escape of any detained person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities, is authorised.

Rule No. 1.10

Use of force, up to, and including deadly force, against any person and/or group that limits or intends to limit freedom of movement is authorised. When and where possible, permission to use force should be sought from the immediate superior commander.

Rule 2. Use of weapon systems

Rule No. 2.1

Use of explosives in order to destroy weapons/ ammunition, mines and unexploded ordnance, in the course of the disarmament exercise, is authorised.

Rule No. 2.2

Indiscriminate pointing of weapons in the direction of any person is prohibited.

Rule No. 2.3

Firing of all weapons other than for organized training and as authorised in these ROE, is prohibited.

Rule No. 2.4

Firing of warning shots is authorised.

Rule No. 2.5

Use of riot control equipment is authorised.

Rule No. 2.6

Use of lasers for survey, range-finding and targeting is authorised.

Rule 3. Authority to carry weapons

Rule No. 3.1

Carriage of weapons is not authorised.

Rule No. 3.2

Carriage of unloaded personal weapons, whilst on duty, is authorised.

Rule No. 3.3

Carriage of unloaded personal weapons, both on duty and as designated by the Force Commander, is authorised.

Rule No. 3.4

Carriage of loaded personal weapons is authorised.

Rule No. 3.5

Hand-held support weapons, such as machine guns, light mortars and hand-held anti-tank weapons, may be carried in UN vehicles, but must be obscured from the public's view.

Rule No. 3.6

Overt carriage by individuals of hand-held support weapons, such as machine guns, light mortars and hand-held anti-tank weapons, is authorised.

Rule 4. Authority to detain, search and disarm

Rule No. 4.1

Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against oneself, one's unit or United Nations personnel is authorised.

Rule No. 4.24

Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against other international personnel is authorised.

Rule No. 4.35

Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent against installations and areas or goods designated by the Head of the Mission in consultation with the Force Commander, is authorised.

Rule No. 4.4

Searching, including of detained person(s), for weapons, ammunition and explosives is authorised.

Rule No. 4.5

Disarming individuals, when so directed by the Force Commander, is authorised. 4 This Rule can only be included in addition to Rule 4.3 if consistent with the mandate of the UNPKO.

Rule 5. Reaction to civil action/unrest

Rule No. 5.1

Action to counter civil unrest is not authorised.

Rule No. 5.2

When competent local authorities are not in a position to render immediate assistance, detention of any person who creates or threatens to create civil unrest with likely serious consequences for life and property is authorised.

Source: United Nations, Guidelines for the

development of ROE for UNPKO, UN

document MD/FGS/0220.0001, May 2002, Attachment 1.

Appendix 2: Questionnaire

Dear Sir, Madam,

Thank you for taking the time to answer this questionnaire. It may take between 25 to 35 minutes of your time. You are very welcome to expand in any of the questions and to raise additional issues related to UN peacekeeping missions and integrated action related with its missions. This questionnaire is fully confidential and also not individual names will ever appear in the research paper unless specifically requested.

Thank you,

Zelalem Abdela

Indira Gandhi National Open University School of Social Science

Your Organization: _____

Your name: (Optional) _____

Your Functional Title/Area of Work: (Optional) _____

I. peacekeeping mission Programmes

1) How are peacekeeping mission running and assessed in Africa as per your organization experience?

2) How does your organization prioritize for the principles of peacekeeping?

3) What peacekeeping Principles and/or Resolutions and/or Guidelines does your organization strictly apply?

4) What are the mechanisms to ensure these peacekeeping principles are adhered too?

II. Impartiality trend in UNOCI

1) How does your organization perceived or assessed United Nations peacekeeping mission in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI)? (In the eye of principle of peacekeeping, sovereignty, an operational levels)

2) What does impartial mean in your daily work?

3) Please write the most important merits and demerits of peacekeeping?

III. Trend of UN peacekeeping mission in Africa

1) In your opinion, has impartiality had an impact in the way your organization responds to peace and security needs? If so, please describe, i.e.: in relation to UNOCI

2) Does partiality have an impact on peacekeeping mission?

3) Does partiality have an impact on feature UN peacekeeping mission? If so, please describe, i.e.: in relation to UN peacekeeping mission in Africa

4) Any other comment?